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TOO BIG TO FAIL:   
MORAL HAZARD IN AUDITING AND THE NEED  
TO RESTRUCTURE THE INDUSTRY BEFORE IT 
UNRAVELS 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
 
  Large audit firms may believe that they are too big 
to fail.  Arthur Andersen’s 2002 criminal indictment reduced 
their number from five to four, and the government decided 
in 2005 to avoid indicting KPMG for crimes it admitted 
committing.  If audit firms interpret the government’s 
reluctance to indict as signaling aversion to tough action 
against them, moral hazard arises.  This offsets auditing 
improvements mandated by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
that are designed to strengthen auditors’ reputations with 
managers for thoroughness and improve financial statement 
reliability.  Neutralizing this moral hazard requires a 
credible alternative industry structure so that when a large 
audit firm faces failure from criminal or other malfeasance, 
it can be allowed to exit the industry without upsetting the 
financial system that auditing supports. 
  
  An alternative industry structure must make auditing 
at least as effective as it is under the current system and 
should provide enhancements wherever possible.  Examples 
of enhancements include bolstering auditors’ reputations for 
toughness with client managers and delivering more 
transparent information to external users of financial 
information.  One way to restructure the industry along these 
lines is through mandatory financial statement insurance.  
Such insurance would make it clear that no audit firm is too 
big to fail, promote strategic detection and deterrence in 
auditing, produce publicly disclosed indices of financial 
                                                 
* Professor of Law & Business and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Boston College Law 
School.  Thanks to John Coffee, James Cox, Amy Shapiro, Eric Talley, and Arnold Wright.  
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statement reliability, and reduce barriers to entry that 
potential competitors to the four large firms currently face. 
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Introduction 
 
 The U.S. government sometimes rescues troubled enterprises 
whose significance to the national or global economy renders them 
“too big to fail.”  Examples include the government-directed or 
government-coordinated bailouts of Chrysler Corporation in the late 
1970s and of Long Term Capital Management in the late 1990s.  
Such intervention is controversial because the policy sustains a pillar 
of the economy at the cost of creating moral hazard that encourages 
excessive risk taking among organizations that consider themselves 
too big to fail.  
 
 The government is aware of the moral hazard triggered by the 
too big to fail doctrine, epitomized by banking laws that restrict its 
use, and by the restraint it showed when allowing Arthur Andersen to 
fail in 2002.  Yet, having allowed Arthur Andersen to fail, the 
auditing industry is now reduced in size to a historical low of four 
firms that are competent to audit the vast majority of public 
enterprises.  Allowing another firm to fail would produce acute 
industry concentration that would eliminate many clients’ choice of 
auditors.  That prospect could precipitate the audit industry 
unraveling and thus presents a high-magnitude loss risk that may 
lead those firms to believe that they are too big to fail and the 
government to agree.  Such beliefs may be vindicated by how the 
government in 2005 chose not to indict KPMG despite its admitted 
federal crimes in peddling numerous illegal tax shelter schemes. 
 
 The probability of audit firm failure in the foreseeable future is 
considerable, and industry members are able to influence this risk.  
These facts and the temptation among audit firms to believe that they 
are too big to fail compel developing mechanisms to counteract that 
belief and its attendant moral hazard.  Otherwise, the lax audits 
characteristic of the late 1990s may continue, along with the 
proliferation of unreliable financial statements that could lead to 
cataclysmic liability judgments against a large audit firm.  What is 
needed is a credible alternative to the prevailing auditing industry 
structure so that a firm facing failure can be allowed to exit without 
disrupting the financial system that audit firms support.  As the 
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following analysis explains, financial statement insurance can supply 
this credible alternative. 
 
 Part I discusses the probability that one of the four large audit 
firms will fail in the near future and the magnitude of such a failure.  
The probability analysis highlights Professor Eric Talley’s innovative 
model of risk that cautiously suggests that the probability of such a 
failure is high;1 it then extends the model’s implications by 
explaining how this risk is within audit firms’ control.  As to the 
magnitude of an audit firm’s failure, the discussion shows how a 
single large firm’s failure could unravel the auditing industry by 
eliminating choice in the market for auditing services.  Further, Part I 
considers how the resulting governmental temptation to rescue a 
failing firm creates moral hazard. 
 
 Part II draws insights from parallels between the model of 
audit firm exit risk and catastrophic risk management tools 
developed in complexity theory.  These tools address the peculiar 
features of complex dynamic systems in which even low-probability 
events bear large-magnitude consequences.  Insights from 
complexity theory adapted to auditing prescribe rebuilding impaired 
auditor reputations with managers for toughness and with investors 
for reliability.  The first point leads to endorsing the controversial 
audits of internal control required by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
and promoting strategic methods of auditing practice.  The second 
point calls for auditors to perform and publicly disclose worst-case 
scenario analyses concerning particular financial statements. 
 
 Part III offers an innovative alternative to the existing auditing 
industry that would generate the foregoing benefits and eliminate the 
moral hazard affecting auditors who may believe that their firms are 
too big to fail.  It first explains the drawbacks of existing liability and 
self-insurance practices prevalent in the contemporary auditing 
industry and then contrasts these with the structural advantages of 
financial statement insurance.  This creates benefits that would 
significantly improve the audit function and offer a credible 
                                                 
1 See Eric L. Talley, Cataclysmic Liability Risk Among Big-Four Auditors, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 
_, [8--9] (2006). 
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alternative to the existing auditing industry structure.  Ironically, the 
threat of such a credible alternative might just help save the auditing 
industry from itself by increasing auditors’ effectiveness and thus 
reducing the risk of exit-induced industry unraveling.  
 
I.  Risk 
 
 This Part explores the risk that one of the large audit firms will 
fail in the near future, considering both the probability and the 
magnitude of such an event.  Part I.A explains how such firms face 
substantial liability risks and introduces methods to measure and 
interpret them.  Part I.B presents and evaluates Professor Talley’s 
model of the probability of near-term audit firm exit, concluding that 
the model is a valuable contribution yet subject to important 
limitations.  Part I.C addresses the magnitude of the risk to 
demonstrate how a single large audit firm’s failure could unravel the 
entire auditing industry, compelling immediate policy attention to the 
state of current auditing practice. 
 
A.  Exit and Unraveling 
 
 Four firms audit nearly all large public companies.  A half-
dozen much smaller (but still medium-sized) ones audit the 
remainder.2  This is down from eight large firms two decades ago, 
when several firms in the next tier also represented viable 
competitors to the large firms.  The transformation resulted from the 
dissolution of two firms---in 1991 the viable competitor, Laventhol 
& Horwath, and in 2002 the large firm, Arthur Andersen---and from 
mergers among all other large firms.3  In 2005, a criminal 
investigation for peddling illegal tax shelters threatened to provoke 
                                                 
2 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-03-864, Public Accounting Firms:  Mandated 
Study on Consolidation and Competition 16, 20--22 (2003), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03864.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 
GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation] (finding that four largest firms audit 99% of 
public company sales taken as an aggregate; 97% of public companies with sales exceeding $250 
million; and 78% of all public companies). 
 
3 Mergers were:  (1) in 1987, Peat Marwick Mitchell with KMG into today’s KPMG; (2) in 
1989, Ernst & Whinney with Arthur Young into today’s Ernst & Young; (3) also in 1989, 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells with Touche Ross into today’s Deloitte & Touche; and (4) in 1998, 
Price Waterhouse with Coopers & Lybrand into today’s PricewaterhouseCoopers.  Id. at 10--11. 
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the dissolution of KPMG, one of the remaining four large firms.4  
This was averted by the prosecution’s decision to pursue individual 
accountants rather than the firm. 
 
  Although no large audit firm has exited the industry solely 
because of federal securities fraud class actions, and most exits have 
resulted from mergers, such liability risks have always been 
considerable and appear to be increasing.  Laventhol & Horwath’s 
exit was due, in large part, to a series of money damages in class 
actions concerning the savings-and-loan industry debacle and a tax 
shelter scheme.5  The impact of these damages was compounded by 
the firm’s resulting inability to attract new work or obtain new clients 
and by the adverse effects on its existing clients’ stock prices.6 
 
  Arthur Andersen exited due to a criminal prosecution arising 
from the firm’s violating a consent decree and ensuing criminal 
obstruction of justice charges for witness tampering during 
investigations into the fraud-plagued Enron Corporation. 7  But large-
scale civil liabilities also loomed, including possible federal 
securities fraud class actions.  During the scandal, client flight also 
afflicted Arthur Andersen and can be expected to accompany any 
                                                 
4 See United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 32--34 (D.D.C. 2004) (detailing facts at 
preliminary stage of Internal Revenue Service and Department of Justice investigations into 
widespread criminal conduct at KPMG). 
 
5 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:  The Challenge of Fashioning 
Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 318--19 n.51 (2004) [hereinafter Coffee, Gatekeeper 
Failure] (describing causes of Laventhol & Horvath’s bankruptcy); Morris W. Macey & Frank R. 
Kennedy, Partnership Bankruptcy and Reorganization:  Proposals for Reform, 50 Bus. Law. 879, 
885 (1995) (describing how $73 million judgment entered against Laventhol & Horvath helped 
push firm into bankruptcy); Charles W. Wootton & Stanley D. Tonge, Where Do Clients Go 
When an Accounting Firm Goes Bankrupt?:  The Case of Laventhol & Horwath, 29 Abacus 149, 
151--52 (1993) (recounting wave of lawsuits that brought down Laventhol & Horvath). 
 
6 See William R. Baber et al., Client Security Price Reactions to the Laventhol and Horwath 
Bankruptcy, 33 J. Acct. Res. 385, 388--90 (1995) (finding statistically significant price declines 
in stock of Laventhol & Horwath clients during period surrounding its bankruptcy 
announcement); Macey & Kennedy, supra note 5, at 886 (observing that “as litigation problems 
continued to increase and negative publicity developed in the press, new work and new clients 
became practically unobtainable”). 
 
7 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Andersen’s Fall from Grace, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 917, 919--21 (2003) 
(relating chain of events that led Department of Justice to indict Arthur Andersen). 
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similar contamination that other large audit firms confront in the 
future.8  
 
 Auditors thus face a steady flow of liability risks, some of 
which present staggering consequences, including the possibility of 
industry exit.  Numerous methods for conceptualizing or measuring 
these risks exist; all approaches appreciate how risk is a combination 
of probability and magnitude (likelihood and severity).  An analysis 
may explore the likelihood of a victory or defeat in various litigation 
settings or of a given judgment or total judgments in a given time 
period.  Or an analysis could assess the magnitude of such results, at 
the firm or industry level, on operations, insurability, or even 
solvency.  Determining total risk involves applying some 
combination rule that relates the probability and the magnitude 
assessed.  These tools have different utilities depending on the 
question of interest.  
 
 Consider risk as measured by average settlements of lawsuits 
against auditors, the number of which have steadily increased in 
recent years.9  These can be important metrics for an audit firm’s 
management plans and for policy analysis of the auditing industry.10  
They are particularly useful when audit firms buy third-party liability 
insurance to address such risks.11  Averages are useful because the 
essence of most liability insurance is pooling and then diversifying 
risks, measured using means and standard deviations.  This enables 
insurers to make statistically valid predictions about the relationship 
between premium and investment income on the one hand and loss 
payouts and expenses on the other.  
 
                                                 
8 See Paul K. Chaney & Kirk L. Philpich, Shredded Reputation:  The Cost of Audit Failure, 40 J. 
Acct. Res. 1221 passim (2002) (investigating impact of Enron audit failure on stock market 
valuation assigned to Arthur Andersen’s other clients). 
 
9 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 320 n.56 (citing PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
LLP, 2002 Securit ies Litigation Study 7 (2003)). 
 
10 See Talley, supra note  1, at 6 n.6. 
 
11 Id. at 3. 
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 However, as the number of large audit firms has shrunk, an 
increasingly important question concerns the probability and 
magnitude of a cataclysmic liability payout.  This is important 
because, with only four large firms, catastrophic losses incurred by 
even one of them pose significant systemic consequences.  If only 
three firms are available to serve thousands of global enterprises, 
many enterprises will lack sufficient choice to obtain required 
auditing services.  As a matter of antitrust policy, the resulting 
industry concentration would be intolerable.  The industry as 
currently structured could easily unravel.  Governmental intervention 
would be tempting.12  What is the probability and magnitude of such 
failure? 
 
 Casualty and liability insurers address such questions by 
conceiving of right-tail risk (RTR)---payouts that appear along the 
right tail of statistical probability distribution curves.  This tool 
addresses low-frequency, large-loss events that arise from such 
natural catastrophic phenomena as earthquakes and floods and man-
made events like terrorism and financial calamity.  A common 
quantitative tool, called the expected policyholder deficit, measures 
catastrophic risk as the expected difference between (a) the present 
value of claims paid plus costs and (b) the present value of premiums 
collected plus investment income.13  Insurers employ varying 
actuarial measures and methodologies in assessing right-tail risk, 
including the expected policyholder deficit as well as standard 
                                                 
12 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 345 (“The ironic truth is that the four global 
accounting firms that remain today have become ‘too big to fail.’”); John M. Holcomb, 
Corporate Governance:  Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Related Legal Issues, and Global Comparisons, 32 
Denv. J. Int’l L. & Pol’y 175, 203 (2004) (“[T]he major accounting firms may be politically 
insulated from further criminal prosecution and, in a sense, may have become too big to fail.”); 
The Future of Auditing:  Called to Account, Economist, Nov. 20, 2004, at 71--72 (quoting 
Dartmouth College, Tuck Business School, Dean Paul Danos that “these firms are too important 
to fail---but there are mechanisms by which they could fail” and Duke University Law School 
Professor James Cox that “[t]he reality is that the Big Four is very likely too big to fail.  
Regulators know this ---and that is a huge moral hazard.”). 
 
13 See, e.g., Michael M. Barth, A Comparison of Risk-Based Capital Standards Under the 
Expected Policyholder Deficit and the Probability of Ruin Approaches, 67 J. Risk & Ins. 397, 
397--98, 400--04 (2000) (expla ining expected policyholder deficit approach and critiquing it in 
context of its growing embrace by insurance agencies and regulators); Richard A. Ippolito, 
Bankruptcy and Workers:  Risks, Compensation and Pension Contracts, 82 Wash. U. L.Q. 1251, 
1281--82 (2004) (explaining and using this tool to illustrate and analyze status of Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation). 
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deviation, the Gini mean, and innovative tools known as right-tail 
deviation and right-tail index.14 
 
 Stoked by the amplified magnitude of events like terrorist 
attacks and phenomena like financial concentration, the academic 
literature on risk increasingly applies formal models to assess 
probabilities and magnitudes that take account of catastrophic risk.15  
Strictly in terms of the dollar amounts of auditor liability, the 2000s 
have brought the largest legal payouts against auditors in history, 
with several exceeding $100 million. 16  While scholars may disagree 
on which is more important, the average or the catastrophic case,17 
for contemporary auditing, “the risk of catastrophic loss, not the 
increase in average settlement value, is the factor most likely to 
cause the market for [auditing] services to unravel.”18 
 
 As a matter of intuition, therefore, one may hypothesize that 
the risk of such a judgment inducing a firm to exit---with resulting 
                                                 
14 See J. David Cummins, Allocation of Capital in the Insurance Industry, 3 Risk Mgmt. & Ins. 
Rev. 7, 9, 11--26 (2000) (discussing capital-allocation techniques, including expected 
policyholder deficit approach, that have been suggested or employed in insurance industry to 
calculate required capital amounts and pointing out that “long-tail liability policies are likely to 
lead to different investment objectives than funds raised by issuing short-tail property insurance 
policies”); Shawn Wang, An Actuarial Index of the Right-Tail Risk, 2 N. Am. Actuarial J. 88 
(1998). 
 
15 See, e.g., Michelle E. Boardman, Known Unknowns:  The Illusion of Terrorism Insurance, 93 
Geo. L.J. 783 passim (2005) (assessing feasibility of terrorism insurance with reference to 
traditional catastrophic risks such as natural disasters); Robert J. Rhee, Terrorism Risk in a Post-
9/11 Economy:  The Convergence of Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Action, 37 
Ariz. St. L.J. 435, 464--78 (2005) (assessing applicability of traditional insurability criteria to 
catastrophic terrorism); see also The Financing of Catastrophic Risk (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 
1999) (compiling several articles on catastrophic risk). 
 
16 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 342 (detailing four settlements through 2004 
exceeding $100 million:  settlements of $110 million, $125 million, $217 million, and $335 
million); Talley, supra note 1, at 67 n.105 (noting Fortress Re  settlement in 2005 of $250 
million). 
 
17 Compare W. Kip Viscusi, The Social Costs of Punitive Damages Against Corporations in 
Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 Geo. L.J. 285, 285 (1998) (emphasizing juror awards of 
punitive damages in rare cases when these reach such large sums as to “pose a catastrophic threat 
of corporate insolvency”), with Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages:  
An Empirical Study, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 743, 745 (2002) (emphasizing that jury awards of 
punitive damages are rare and in most cases they “relate strongly to compensatory awards”). 
 
18 Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 342. 
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industry shrinkage so acute as to threaten industry unraveling---is 
high in likelihood and severity.  This may be so despite various legal 
reforms of the mid-1990s tending to reduce such risk, given how 
reforms of the early-2000s install new ones.  Thus, for example, 
while the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 
shifted to proportionate from joint liability for auditors,19 the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes new demands on auditors that increase 
liability risk, including through new audits of internal control over 
financial reporting.20  How, then, might one measure the likelihood 
of such an exit-inducing liability imposition against one of the four 
large audit firms?   
 
B.  Probability 
 
 Professor Talley develops a probability model of near-term 
audit firm exit based on a measure of right-tail liability risk from 
federal securities fraud class actions (the “Audit Industry RTR 
Model”).21  The following summarizes the Model and then provides 
three critiques.  
 
 1.  Audit Industry Right-Tail Risk --- The Audit Industry RTR 
Model assesses the likelihood that at least one of the four large audit 
firms will fail shortly because of liability resulting from federal 
securities fraud class actions.  Professor Talley conceptualizes RTR 
by relating alternative audit firm viability thresholds to the risk of 
liability exposure above them over the next one to five years.  This 
                                                 
19 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000) (adopting 
heightened pleading standards, staying discovery pending motions to dismiss, and shifting to 
proportional from joint-and-several liability); see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards 
Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77p, 78bb(f) (2000)) (effectively banning related legal actions from 
state and federal court adjudication). 
 
20 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262(a) (Supp. 2002); see also Management’s 
Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in 
Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-8238, 34-47,986, Investment 
Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 18, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. 
pts. 210, 228, 229, 240, 249, 270, 274) (noting discussions and comments affecting 
implementation of various sections of Sarbanes -Oxley Act, including concerning internal control 
reports); infra text accompanying notes 161--166. 
 
21 Talley, supra note 1, at 71--72.  Professor Talley mostly leaves the question of magnitude for 
further inquiry while offering some useful notes on the issue.  See id. at 104; infra Part I.C. 
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requires, in turn, estimating both a plausible viability threshold and a 
probability distribution of exposure. 
 
 To approximate viability thresholds, the Audit Industry RTR 
Model employs assumptions for a “pivotal partner” in a large firm 
deciding whether to exit or continue.22  Assumptions contributing to 
higher viability thresholds are, on a per pivotal partner basis:  
revenue, closing costs, and perishable employee benefits.  Those 
tending to contribute to lower viability thresholds are the pivotal 
partner’s years to retirement, cash flow from his or her next best 
option, the search periods required to obtain alternative employment, 
and that partner’s share of damages, fines, or costs.23  While these 
assumptions capture important factors, others may be relevant but 
not susceptible to scientific verification or even roughly reliable 
estimation.  For example, litigation costs in federal securities fraud 
class actions are difficult to determine and vary considerably across 
cases.  
 
 So devised and limited, the Audit Industry RTR Model 
estimates viability thresholds of $454 million to $2.15 billion.24  
Although in line with anecdotal estimates, Professor Talley expressly 
recognizes these figures as “very speculative and open to 
considerable debate.”25  Invoking also the settlement level of a 
contemporaneous non-class action, for purposes of the Model, 
                                                 
22 The Audit Industry RTR Model uses the concept of a pivotal partner as the median among 
other partners of a large firm, half of whom may prefer dissolution earlier, and the others later, 
than the pivotal partner.  The pivotal partner’s analysis is thus the tipping point of a firm-wide 
decision to dissolve or continue.  See Talley, supra note 1, at 74. 
 
23 Revenues are estimated as $312 million to $2 billion; the next best alternative is deemed the 
same as that given up; required search periods are assumed to be one year (a hunch based on the 
smoothness of relocating Arthur Andersen partners); years to retirement is guessed at 15; the 
time discount factor is taken to be about 9% (extrapolated from the audit industry’s internal rate 
of return); and rough guesses are made of the other items:  perishable employee benefits of $10 
million; 2% partner participation rate in firm profits; and $5 to $10 million in closing costs.  Id. 
at 77--79. 
 
24 Id. at 79--80.  This is a large range but it is difficult to develop a prudential model with a 
narrower one.  
 
25 Id. at 80. 
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Professor Talley sets the low end of the viability threshold at $250 
million.26 
 
 To estimate the distribution of exposure, Professor Talley uses 
historical data on lawsuit filings and settlements.27  He adjusts these 
data for inflation although, to increase the Model’s statistical power, 
not so much for legal changes.28  Lawsuit data are drawn from 
multiple sources and are arrayed against data on market volatility as 
a recognized predictor of filing levels.29  The submodel of market 
volatility as a predictor of lawsuit filings is a function of various 
market factors.30  The Audit Industry RTR Model appears to do well 
at explaining the historical pattern of liability. 31  Professor Talley 
uses the resulting coefficient estimates to make out-of-sample 
predictions about the future distribution of exposure.32  
 
 A total of 132 cases in the sample of federal securities fraud 
class actions name auditors as defendants.33  Case outcomes were 
                                                 
26 See id. at 80 (settlement concerning audit of Fortress Re). 
 
27 Id. at 81--83. 
 
28 Professor Talley addresses some legal change by creating certain statistical lags and time 
trends.  See id. at 81. 
 
29 Id. at 83--85.  Data on lawsuit filings include the SCAA data set dating to 1992 (containing 
3600 cases, ninety percent of which are class actions), augmented by separate data from 1960--
1995.  Market volatility data are obtained from CRSP.  Professor Talley states that it is well 
known that lawsuit filings correlate with market volatility (measured by standard deviation of the 
average monthly return during a year of the value weighted CRSP portfolio); he maps the 1991--
2003 volatility data onto lawsuits to show that volatility is a good predictor of lawsuit filing 
levels.  Id. at 81--85. 
 
30 Id. at 85.  The model is based on the number of public firms, volatility, market capitalization, 
industry composition, and time trends.  Id. at 84. 
 
31 Id. at 87. 
 
32 Id. at 91. 
 
33 This is fewer than ten percent of all actions.  Id. at 86.  The percentage has decreased 
considerably since the Supreme Court announced that federal securities laws do not authorize 
private securities fraud actions against those aiding and abetting securities fraud.  See Cent. Bank 
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1994) (“We reach the 
uncontroversial conclusion . . . that the text of the 1934 Act does not itself reach those who aid 
and abet a § 10(b) violation.”).  In Professor Talley’s summary data, 6.55% of cases did so (132 
of 2,016 cases), although the summary data did not always expressly identify all defendants; a 
hand sample adjustment of the undercount led Professor Talley to increase the estimate to 8.41%.  
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determinable in seventy-nine of the 132 cases, with six of these 
dismissed altogether and seven dismissing the audit firm.  The 
resulting liability distribution, approximated by the size of related 
settlement funds, showed a significant right-tail skew with the 
empirical data fitting well to a log-normal distribution.34  Finally, 
projecting the proportion of lawsuits to particular firms, Professor 
Talley assigns one quarter apiece to each of the four large firms, 
noting that one could use other apportionments, such as market share 
or interpolations of the historical liability experience of each firm.35 
 
 Supposing that one could accurately predict the number of 
future lawsuits, what is the right-tail risk?  Professor Talley offers a 
synthesis and findings of the Audit Industry RTR Model.  The 
projections array assumed numbers of cases filed (ranging from five 
to fifty)36 across (x), a horizontal axis depicting viability thresholds 
(from $250 million to $2 billion), and (y), a resulting vertical axis 
showing right-tail risk (from 0% to 100%).  To illustrate, a $500 
million viability threshold and five lawsuits yields a RTR of 2.2%; 
with twenty lawsuits, the RTR is 23.2%.  This increasing RTR 
suggests a “lawsuit lottery”---the more lawsuits, the greater the 
likelihood that one of the four large audit firms soon will seek to exit 
as a result of federal securities fraud class actions.37  
 
 Projecting numbers of lawsuits according to varying market 
volatility and using two different time horizons (one year and five 
                                                                                                                                   
Talley, supra note 1, at 86. 
 
34 Talley, supra note 1, at 88--89.  That is, the natural log of the settlement amount was normally 
distributed, with a mean of approximately $13 million and a standard deviation of 1.81. 
 
35 Talley, supra note 1, at 35--36.  Extrapolating from historical data, and assuming a reallocation 
of lawsuits previously filed against Arthur Andersen, resulting distributions were 21% to PWC 
and 26% to each of the other three; using market share (by registrants or asset values) rendered a 
distribution of 18%, 26%, 27% and 29%.  See infra text accompanying notes 50--52. 
 
36 Arraying the data across the range of lawsuits from five to fifty offers a substantially 
comprehensive picture when one considers that the sample set shows only 132 federal securities 
fraud class action cases naming auditors (roughly thirteen per year distributed across five to eight 
audit firms). 
 
37 See generally Jeffrey O’Connell, The Lawsuit Lottery 8 (1979) (“Most crucial criteria for 
payment [to tort plaintiffs] are largely controlled by chance . . . .”). 
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years), Professor Talley draws the following conclusions.  Within 
one year, nearly all viability threshold and market volatility 
combinations give RTRs of less than twenty percent (with exceptions 
at the lowest viability threshold and above average volatility) and 
with none exceeding fifty percent.  But for a five year horizon, RTRs 
are dramatically higher across the board and close in on 100% at 
combinations of low viability thresholds and high market volatility 
levels. 
 
 These findings suggest a looming crisis---at least in terms of 
the probability of a large audit firm’s exit (that is, setting aside the 
magnitude of such an exit).  The following discussion evaluates the 
main strengths and weaknesses of the Audit Industry RTR Model for 
assessing this suggestion.  
 
 3.  Three Critiques. --- The Audit Industry RTR Model is 
statistically and conceptually ambitious, although Professor Talley 
emphasizes the Model’s assumptions, judgments, and scope to warn 
against employing it exclusively as the basis for any policy 
prescriptions.38  Rather, the Model should be used to provide an 
additional piece of information that may be useful in studying policy 
matters, when conjoined with all other available evidence.39  Despite 
the prudence of this cautionary modesty, the Model is a valuable 
contribution and sheds specific new light on a widely recognized but 
underutilized set of insights.  The three critiques of the Audit 
Industry RTR Model that follow, along with further analysis, open 
into broader policy prescriptions that are explored afterwards. 
 
 a.  First, in any statistical model of risk, numerous factors can 
result in assessments that vary widely.  The Audit Industry RTR 
Model illustrates this, given the numerous assumptions it makes 
when estimating viability thresholds and exposure distributions.  
Others reasonably could reach different decisions on the various 
judgments concerning matters such as data reliability, the attributes 
of participants whose decisions are modeled, the interpretation of 
                                                 
38 Talley, supra note 1, at 7--9. 
 
39 Id. at 6--9. 
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ambiguous evidence, and factors that are based entirely on opinion.  
In the Audit Industry RTR Model, for example, pivotal partners are 
highly abstract and make decisions according to delineated factors 
such as revenue, costs, employee benefits, years to retirement, cash 
flow from next-best options, required search periods, and shares of 
damages.40 
 
 Analysts must make judgments when extrapolating from 
known risks (the historical data) to unknown risks (the future 
behaving differently according to different environments).  While 
historical data fit well when tested with the Audit Industry RTR 
Model, Professor Talley’s deployment of the data to make out-of-
sample predictions could make a purist statistician quiver.  After all, 
among other dynamics, the auditing industry’s regulatory structure 
has changed since 2002, making data from previous periods 
potentially incomparable with future periods. 
 
 Induced by scandals, auditors face new duties, independence 
standards, and oversight structures.  New duties include performing 
audits of internal control over financial reporting and providing 
related reports.41  New independence standards, first established by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and rendered into 
law by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, restrict auditors from rendering for 
audit clients an extensive catalogue of non-audit services.42  New 
oversight structures include:  reposing supervisory authority over 
auditors in board audit committees rather than in management and 
creating the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
                                                 
40 Id. at 72. 
 
41 Professor Talley notes this change in canvassing potential sources of auditor liability but 
explains how it cannot be modeled because there are simply no data as to related enforcement.  
Id. at 16. 
 
42 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, as under SEC rules adopted a few years earlier, auditors may not 
perform any of the following services for audit clients:  bookkeeping; financial information 
systems; appraisal, valuation, or fairness opinions; actuarial; internal audit; management 
functions; human resources; broker or dealer, investment adviser, or investment banking; legal 
and expert services unrelated to the audit.  Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 § 201(a), 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78j-1(g) (Supp. 2002); see also 17 C.F.R. § 210.2-01(c)(1) (2005) (listing services that, if 
performed, render accountant no longer independent). 
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to regulate audit firms in ways that industry associations did before 
2002.43 
   
 Despite environmental changes and overblown rhetoric about 
them, much about the auditing industry is unchanged compared to 
periods from which the Model’s sampled cases are taken. 44  For 
example, apart from some important legal refinements---such as 
PSLRA’s shift to proportionate rather than joint liability for 
auditors45---sources of auditor liability based on performance still 
hinge on standards that the industry---and now PCAOB---establish.46  
A stubborn continuity is how auditors are compensated by the 
enterprises whose financial statements they audit and opine upon---a 
dependency contributing severe structural infirmities to financial 
reporting.47  Thus, while the future always potentially differs from 
the past, less has changed in auditing industry regulation than meets 
many eyes.48 
                                                 
43 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (Supp. 2002).  Among PCAOB’s first 
orders of business was adopting as governing auditing standards all those standards then in effect 
as established by its industry-dominated predecessors.  See Prof. Standards, Rules 3200T, 
3300T, 3400T, 3500T, 3600T (Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2006) (interim standards 
effective Apr. 25, 2003); Order Regarding Section 103(a)(3)(B) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002, Securities Act Release No. 8222, Exchange Act Release No. 47745, 80 SEC Docket 142 
(Apr. 25, 2003). 
 
44 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn:  Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform 
(And It Might Just Work), 35 Conn. L. Rev. 915, 979, 987--88 (2003) [hereinafter Cunningham, 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn]. 
 
45 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4 (2000). 
 
46 Supra note 43; see, e.g., Monroe v. Hughes, 31 F.3d 772, 774 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that 
while “good faith compliance with [GAAP] and [GAAS] discharges the accountant’s 
professional obligation to act with reasonable care” courts may also consult general accounting 
industry standards to determine adequate reporting obligations); In re Worlds of Wonder Sec. 
Litig., 35 F.3d 1407, 1417, 1426 (9th Cir. 1994) (relying on adherence to GAAP and toy industry 
standards to refute accusation of bad faith accounting practices);  Adams v. Standard Knitting 
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 432--33 (6th Cir. 1980) (same); In re SmarTalk TeleServices, Inc. Sec. 
Litig., 124 F. Supp. 2d 505, 514--15 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (holding that errors in GAAP that are later 
revealed may demonstrate negligence but “highly suspicious facts” must be shown to 
demonstrate reckless and deliberate violation of securities laws).   
 
47 See infra text accompanying notes 207--208. 
 
48 As to other changing features, such as in the legal environment, Professor Talley wrestles with 
these using a variety of time trends and other devices.  See Talley, supra note 1, at 35; supra note 
27 and accompanying text. 
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 Moreover, the Audit Industry RTR Model conceptually 
replicates similar tools commonly used in casualty and liability 
insurance markets to grapple with the relation between known data 
and the unknown future.  The Model relates, at a macro level, a 
pivotal audit firm partner’s calculus comparing costs of continuing 
with costs of exit.  As such, it is an impressive adaptation of 
conventional right-tail risk models.  It usefully estimates probabilities 
of cataclysmic liability judgments from federal securities fraud class 
actions that could provoke audit firm exit.  
 
 The data could be harnessed to illuminate the specific risk of 
particular firms teetering toward exit.  The Audit Industry RTR 
Model allocates a proportion of lawsuits to particular firms.  
Professor Talley notes as possibilities:  market share, interpolation 
from historical experience, or equal distributions, and chooses the 
lattermost.49  An unmentioned alternative would account for how 
audit firms tend to specialize in certain industries.50  Some industries 
use accounting policies for which risk of audit failure and firm 
liability likely differ from others.51  This would skew liability risks 
among firms, meaning different right-tail risks for each of the four 
large firms.52  An Audit Firm RTR Model would be a useful adjunct-
                                                 
49 Talley, supra note 1, at 35--36; supra note 35. 
 
50 GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 27--30, app. IV at 110--15 
(noting that in numerous industries, two firms audit more than seventy percent of assets, 
highlighting petroleum and coal, communications, primary metals, and fabricated metals); see 
also infra text accompanying notes 97--100. 
 
51 Accounting irregularities can appear in any industry or enterprise, notably concerning 
pervasive issues such as revenue and expense recognition.  See Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Study Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Problems can be 
especially difficult for businesses experiencing particularly rapid growth or change or those in 
new and rapidly changing industries.  Of late, this means those sectors that increasingly rely 
upon intangible rather than tangible assets.  See Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Measuring and 
Reporting the Knowledge Economy:  Accounting for Economic Reality Under the Intangibles 
Paradigm, 54 Buff. L. Rev. 1, 7--10 (2006). 
 
52 This differs from historical interpolation, which projects firm-specific risk according to the 
historical loss distribution, without regard to the distribution of engagements or firm 
specialization.  An approach would classify the 132 cases in the sample by industry and relate 
these to individual firm industry concentration data.  Such a model might be dubbed the Audit 
Firm RTR Model.  Part II.C.2 contemplates a further refinement called the Audit Client  RTR 
Model. 
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--although admittedly subject to similar limitations as the Audit 
Industry RTR Model.  
 
 b. A second critique of the Audit Industry RTR Model 
concerns its scope of exit-risk sources.  The Model uses frequency 
data on one source of auditor liability risk, federal securities fraud 
class actions.  This is a practical necessity given available data, but 
numerous other factors contribute to audit firm exit risk.53  
 
 Recall, for example, how a confluence of forces, including 
client disaffection, contributed to the demise of both Laventhol & 
Horwath and Arthur Andersen.54  The proximate cause of Arthur 
Andersen’s exit was a criminal prosecution precipitated, in turn, by 
its violation of a consent decree in a previous SEC enforcement 
action.55  In 2005, KPMG narrowly averted a similar plight from its 
criminal conduct in peddling illegal tax shelters.56  Also, as noted, 
mergers have been the major source of audit firm exit in the past two 
decades.57  Professor Talley speculates, on the other hand, that the 
Department of Justice would not likely allow exit by merger of any 
of the remaining large audit firms.58 
 
 Even so, completing the Audit Industry RTR Model requires 
incorporating proxies for all such other sources of exit risk.  This 
presents a formidable hurdle, given limited data on such forces.  How 
would one measure the prospects of forthcoming criminal 
indictments, for example?  But this limitation makes the Model’s 
probability estimates conservative.  When liability looms from one 
                                                 
53 Professor Talley provides a primer on sources of litigation risk.  This includes a table and 
summary of the legal landscape.  Talley, supra note 1, at 27.  The selection of federal securities 
fraud class actions has appeal as providing the most comprehensive context for inquiring into 
national policy implications and is an important piece of the overall public policy analysis.  Id.  
 
54 See supra text accompanying notes 3--9. 
 
55 See United States v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 374 F.3d 281, 289--91 (5th Cir. 2004), rev’d on 
other grounds, 125 S. Ct. 2129 (2005). 
 
56 See United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30, 31--32 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 
57 See supra text accompanying note 3. 
 
58 Talley, supra note 1, at 44--45. 
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source, associated liabilities often arise from others.59  As noted, 
sources of auditor liability hinge on generally accepted auditing 
standards (GAAS).60  GAAS departures violate laws enforced in 
federal securities fraud class actions and in many other contexts, 
including criminal and SEC actions.  So while Professor Talley’s 
data do not capture all the components of potential cataclysm facing 
the auditing industry, adding the others would increase the 
probability of audit firm exit risk. 
 
 c.  The third critique of the Audit Industry RTR Model is of 
greatest policy significance.  Professor Talley explains that the 
“strategy of [his] study is to conceptualize liability risk solely as 
exogenous, attempting to [assess] whether observed exposure events 
characterize the types of risk that theory would predict to be 
uninsurable.”61  In effect, this is a pure frequency model in that it 
does not allow for Bayseian updating of participant beliefs (that is, as 
auditors acquire more information, their behavior likely changes and 
this would alter the risk assessment calculus).  Some contrast this 
latter, updating method with the pure frequency method by 
denominating the probability assessment exercises as subjectivist and 
objectivist, respectively.62  Each has its limits. 
 
 The exogenous factors conceptualization essentially assumes 
that some litigation risk exists beyond auditors’ control.  The 
decision to take this approach is influenced, in part, by an unresolved 
debate in the academic literature concerning how much the merits of 
a lawsuit matter in assessing liability risk.  Scholars debate the ability 
of firms to avoid litigation.63  Debate turns further on whether 
                                                 
59 Professor Talley notes how sources of liability risk “overlap,” “traverse,” and interact in 
complex ways, so that a “comprehensive analysis of cataclysmic liability risk borne by auditors” 
would need to incorporate all related variables, but this is simply not possible given available 
data.  Id. 
 
60 See supra notes 44, 47, and accompanying text. 
 
61 Talley, supra note 1, at 5.  Part III, infra, inquires into the implications for insurance theory 
and practice. 
 
62 See Ann Bostrom, Risk Perceptions:  “Experts” vs. “Lay People”, 8 Duke Envtl. L. & Pol’y F. 
101, 104 n.15 (1997). 
 
63 See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter?  A Study of Settlements in Securities 
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various legal reforms alter related liability exposure.64  Amid the 
academic stalemate, auditors may face risks endogenous to their own 
actions (that is, within their control), important for any belief in law’s 
deterrent effect; but with the sizable risk of frivolous litigation, 
auditors cannot effectively change their relevant behavior except by 
exit.65 
 
  Apart from this theoretical defense of the exogenous frequency 
approach, attempting to incorporate variables such as audit quality 
would inject too much noise into the Audit Industry RTR Model.66  
This valid point says more about the limits of statistical modeling 
generally than about this Model in particular.  And this 
conceptualization also renders the Model a conservative estimation 
in the sense of capturing worst case scenarios that, while not 
necessarily likely, are cognizable.  As well, it would be surprising if 
cases tripping the Model’s viability threshold---ranging from several 
hundred million dollars to more than one billion dollars---were 
entirely without legal merit.  
 
 Moreover, it is one thing to stipulate that the merits might not 
matter when estimating liability exposure and establishing a model; it 
is another to believe that auditors cannot influence the quality of their 
                                                                                                                                   
Class Actions, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 497, 524 (1991) (arguing that structural characteristics of legal 
system preclude merits being included in settlement calculus); Joel Seligman, The Merits Do 
Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994); David L. Gilbertson & Steven D. Avila, The Plaintiffs’ 
Decision to Sue Auditors in Securities Litigation:  Private Enforcement or Opportunism?, 24 J. 
Corp. L. 681, 707 (1999) (finding three opportunism variables to be significantly associated with 
plaintiffs’ attorneys’ decisions to name auditors as codefendants in securities class action 
lawsuits). 
 
64 See, e.g., James D. Cox & Randall Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Institutional Investors 
as Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Fraud Class Actions, 106 Colum. L. Rev. __ (2006); Talley, supra 
note 1, at 5 (comparing literature that reaches differing conclusions on this question and finding 
PSLRA’s lead plaintiff provision does add some value for shareholders); Michael Perino, Did the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 913, 915 (finding PSLRA 
did not result in decrease of class actions filed); Hillary A. Sale, Heightened Pleading and 
Discovery Stays:  An Analysis of the Effect of the PSLRA’s Internal-Information Standard on 
’33 and ’34 Act Claims, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 537, 578--79 (1998) (arguing PSLRA’s pleading 
standard, if strictly applied and interpreted, will be overinclusive and eliminate most private 
securities-fraud lawsuits). 
 
65 Talley, supra note 1, at 5. 
 
66 See id. at 40. 
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audits that, at least in some ways, contribute to related risks.  So, 
without making conjectures about how auditor behavior may bear on 
the exact role of the merits in assessing liability risk, consider some 
evidence of variability of audit quality that suggests auditor capacity 
to influence risk.  It speaks to how auditors can and do make 
Bayesian updating adjustments, without regard to the academic 
debate over how the merits matter in litigation.  
 
 Auditing is easiest and most effective when auditors enjoy a 
reputation for conservatism and firmness that deters managers from 
attempting to engage in accounting deception.  As an auditor’s 
reputation for toughness slackens, managerial willingness to pursue 
accounting shenanigans and even fraud can increase.  Considerable 
evidence supports the view that the reputation of auditors changed 
during the 1990s from one of scrupulous watchdog to conciliatory 
lapdog.67  
 
 First, institutionally, audit firms expanded their services well 
beyond the audit function.  This practice embedded the large audit 
firms in deeply incestuous relationships with their clients, impairing 
their independence.68  As examples, Ernst & Young developed a 
business partnership with its client, PeopleSoft;69 some of KPMG’s 
illegal tax shelters, for which it narrowly escaped criminal 
indictment, were provided to clients and their audit committee 
members;70 and both KPMG and PWC owned investments in their 
                                                 
67 See, e.g., AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 991 F. Supp. 234, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), 
rev’d, 206 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 
68 This may have been due, in part, to policies of the Federal Trade Commission that induced the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) to rescind a ban on advertising and 
other methods of client solicitation.  See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 772 (1993) (discussing 
AICPA report on its decision).  This policy may have been improvident.  To the extent that it 
unleashed competition in a market in which the product’s external quality is essentially 
unobservable, the competition can impair product quality.  See George A. Akerlof, The Market 
for “Lemons”:  Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488, 488--89 
(1970). 
 
69 See In the Matter of Ernst & Young, Exchange Act Release No. 46,710 (Oct. 23, 2002), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/opinions/34-46710.htm (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
 
70 See United States v. KPMG LLP, 316 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2004); see also Sheldon D. 
Pollack & Jay A. Soled, Tax Professionals Behaving Badly, 105 Tax Notes 201, 210 (2004).  
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audit clients.71  Auditors also impaired their independence by 
performing for audit clients extensive non-audit services that 
generated considerable revenue compared to audit revenue.72  
Impaired independence reduced auditors’ reputations as watchdogs, 
which likely tempted many managers to indulge in accounting 
aggressions.  These infirmities prompted the SEC’s ban on auditors 
performing most non-audit services for their clients, the ban later 
adopted in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.73 
 
 Second, auditor complicity during the 1990s manifested itself 
in the growth of extensively catalogued accounting irregularities of 
the period.  These included widespread premature revenue 
recognition, pervasive use of “big bath” accounting, extensive 
creation and exploitation of artificial reserves, and other deceptions.74  
Auditors signed off on these aggressions, suggesting ability to 
influence audit quality, financial statement reliability, and liability 
                                                 
71 See In the Matter of PricewaterhouseCoopers, Exchange Act Release No. 40,945 (Jan. 14, 
1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-40945.txt (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review); Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Censures KPMG for Auditor 
Independence Violation (Jan. 14, 2002), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2002-4.txt (on file 
with the Columbia Law Review). 
 
72 See William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 Tul. L. Rev. 
1275, 1350 (2002) (stating that fees from audit clients for non-audit services rose from thirteen 
percent of revenues in the 1970s to fifty percent of revenues in the 1990s); Jeffrey N. Gordon 
What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business Corporation: Some 
Initial Reflections, 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1233, 1237 (2002) (arguing that most important guarantor 
of auditor independence is saliency of auditor terminations, a material event that must promptly 
be disclosed, but the value of which drops dramatically when audit firms cross-sell consulting 
services which give auditors incentives not to sever clients); Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability 
of a Strong SEC, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 775, 786 (2006) (“[C]onsulting fees rose from seventeen 
percent of audit fees in 1990 to sixty-seven percent in 1999 . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 
73 See supra note 41.  In KPMG’s case, the infirmities also led to additional restrictions on its 
practice.  See United States v. Stein, No. 05 CR 00888(LAK)(ECF), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
42915 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006).  Despite these restrictions on non-audit services, firms are still 
permitted to provide tax services to audit clients.  See Matthew J. Barrett, “Tax Services” as a 
Trojan Horse in the Auditor Independence Provisions of Sarbanes -Oxley, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 
463. 
 
74 See Arthur Levitt, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, The “Numbers Game,” Speech at the 
NYU Center for Law and Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt (on file with the Columbia 
Law Review). 
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exposure.  Subsequent reforms attempt to seal many of these paths to 
accounting fraud.75   
 
 Third, evidence of auditor ability to influence audit quality and 
liability risk appears in dramatic changes in the number of financial 
restatements, frequency of auditor switching, and percentage of 
qualified opinions given.  Restatements soared to a record high of 
160 by 1999,76 with all large audit firms inculpated.77  These do not 
automatically signal auditor failure, as they can be due to evolving 
interpretations of accounting standards or similar innocuous 
circumstances.78  But they show varying auditor ability to influence 
audit quality and therefore liability risk.79   
 
 The fact that auditors increasingly began to sever clients after 
the 1990s era of auditing laxity ended80 suggests that the related 
                                                 
75 See, e.g., SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 101, 17 C.F.R. pt. 211 (1999) (revenue 
recognition); Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 146 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 
2002) (big bath accounting). 
 
76 These averaged forty-nine annually from 1990--1997, jumped to ninety-one in 1998, and then 
climbed to 150 and 156 in 1999 and 2000, respectively.  See George B. Moriarty & Philip B. 
Livingston, Quantitative Measures of the Quality of Financial Reporting, Fin. Executive, 
July/Aug. 2001, at 53, 54.  They have risen more dramatically since reforms created in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  
 
77 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Report on Financial Statement Restatements:  Trends, 
Market Impacts, Regulatory Responses and Remaining Challenges 4 (2002); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Jonathan R. Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different?  An Empirical Examination of 
Major Accounting Firm Audits of Large Clients, 1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 263 (2004). 
 
78 See William R. Kinney Jr., Zoe-Vonna Palmrose & Susan Scholz, Auditor Independence, 
Non-Audit Services, and Restatements:  Was the U.S. Government Right?, 42 J. Acct. Res. 561, 
566 (2004). 
 
79 See James D. Cox, Reforming the Culture of Financial Reporting:  The PCAOB and the 
Metrics for Accounting Measurements, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 301, 318 (2003) (“The [rise in] 
restatements may well portend both a greater diligence on the part of the auditors as well as a 
stiffening of their resolve.”); A. C. Pritchard, The Irrational Auditor and Irrational Liability, 10 
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 19, 27 (2006) (“The restatement itself is ambiguous:  does it reflect poor 
auditing in the past, or particularly diligent auditing today?”); see also Coffee, Gatekeeper 
Failure, supra note 5, at 314--15 (attributing restatement levels of late 1990s to managerial 
ambitions that showed broad willingness to assume greater risks---accompanied by auditor 
solicitude). 
 
80 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 348 n.148.  Professor Coffee explains that  
 
In 2003, over 1460 public companies changed auditors, which was the highest 
number in at least five years.  Although such switches could be because the 
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reforms led firms to sever high-risk clients.81  This also suggests that 
auditors are capable of identifying them (and other evidence strongly 
supports this conclusion too).82  Finally, the percentage of qualified 
auditor reports increased significantly from 1999 to 2002, signaling 
similar auditor ability to influence liability risk.83  Assessments of 
audit firm failure probability should take account of this auditor 
ability to influence liability risk and the concomitant risk of firm exit.  
 
* * * 
 
 To incorporate these three critiques of the Audit Industry RTR 
Model, the dynamics of auditing practice and the legal and regulatory 
environment pose difficulties for prognostications based upon data 
spanning across the previous ten or fifteen years.  Those are quite 
different eras.  Professor Talley grapples with these difficulties by 
using various time trends and proxies.  This is a credible attempt to 
tame a model trained on the exogenous rather than the endogenous 
but (a) the two are tightly interwoven and (b) the exogenous changes 
over time.  Nevertheless, Professor Talley’s estimates are 
conservative.  
                                                                                                                                   
client was dissatisfied with the auditor, many were because the auditor 
considered the client too risky---or because the auditor raised its fees in light of 
that increased risk. . . . By itself, this evidence may not prove that auditors are 
becoming significantly more selective with regard to clients, but it is at least 
consistent with such a hypothesis. 
 
Id. 
 
81 See Jagan Krishman, Auditor Switching and Conservatism, 69 Acct. Rev. 200, 200 (1994) 
(attributing auditor switching to auditor determinations to withhold unqualified opinions based 
on conservative critiques of client reporting); Kannan Raghunandan & Dasaratha V. Rama, 
Auditor Resignations and the Market for Audit Services, 18 Auditing:  J. Prac. & Theory 124, 
126 (1999) (showing it is rare for large firm to accept engagements by enterprises whose 
previous auditor resigned). 
 
82 See In re Deloitte & Touche LLP, SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 
2237 (Apr. 26, 2005) (emphasizing that large audit firm knew its client, Adelphia 
Communications Corp., was “high-risk”); infra notes 190--191 (noting Arthur Andersen’s 
manifest awareness of how acutely risky its client, Waste Management, had been). 
 
83 See Marleen Willekens, Auditor Reporting Conservatism as a Defense Mechanism Against 
Increased Post-Enron Litigation Risk 10--11 (working paper on file with author) (probing for 
increases in qualified reports by four large audit firms in post-Enron era and finding:  4.12% in 
1999; 5.41% in 2000; 6.84% in 2001; and 6.85% in 2002). 
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 In assessing the Audit Industry RTR Model’s robustness and 
sources of bias, Professor Talley recognizes how several factors may 
produce downward bias to the estimates.  Most significantly, these 
include how the Model captures solely liability risk associated with 
federal securities fraud class actions, not other exit inducements.84  
Including these would increase cataclysmic probability and project 
greater exit risk.85  Conversely, several factors may produce upward 
bias.  Most significantly, the Model implicitly assumes a constant 
rate of auditor complicity and no decisions to sever high-risk 
clients.86  Changing these assumptions would have opposite effects if 
auditors are diligent (and would exacerbate the ill effects if auditors 
are lax). 
 
 In the end, these concessions do not diminish the importance 
or value of attempting to quantify auditing industry right-tail risk.  
The major open questions---the role of factors other than federal 
securities fraud class actions and of auditor capacity to influence 
ultimate risk---are about the causal force that can bring a risk to 
realization.  True, misconceptions about causality can lead to 
misestimating probability, a core hazard dimension of risk 
assessment.  This can limit the ability to manage risk and prescribe 
suitable policies to address it.  If people believe that auditor exit risk 
is solely a function of the number of lawsuits, market volatility, and 
viability thresholds for example, a problem of causation is created or 
overlooked.   
 
C.  Magnitude 
 
 Equally important is the other core hazard dimension of risk 
assessment:  magnitude.87  If a large audit firm’s exit posed no 
                                                 
84 Talley, supra note 1, at 6--7. 
 
85 Less dramatically, the Model ignores litigation costs which, if included, would likewise 
increase cataclysmic probability and produce greater exit risk.  See id. at 39.   
 
86 Again less dramatically, the Model’s estimates may be higher than reality because (a) fees can 
be increased or matched to offset risk and (b) plaintiffs may restrain themselves lest they kill the 
goose that lays the golden egg.  Id. at 40.   
 
87 Professor Talley focuses on probabilities, although he offers some notes on magnitude to 
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significant systemic consequences, even a 100% probability of that 
occurring would not matter.  But, as the following discusses, the 
systemic consequences of current concentration in the audit industry 
raise immediate policy concerns.  The stakes amplify if, as the Audit 
Industry RTR Model predicts, one soon were to face exit due to 
cataclysmic liabilities.88  Setting aside the costs of bankruptcy 
administration and employee dislocation---whose significance is 
contestable as a matter of theory89---a critical component of the 
magnitude of a large audit firm exiting the industry is its effect on 
audit industry competition.  
 
 1.  Market Concentration. --- The Sarbanes-Oxley Act directed 
the General Accounting Office (GAO) to study the factors leading to 
the four mergers of large audit firms that reduced their number from 
eight to five (Arthur Andersen’s dissolution reduced it further to 
four).90  Factors the GAO identified included keeping pace with 
client size, global reach, and technology, as well as exploiting 
economies of scale.91  Merging with peers was the way to achieve 
these goals.  The resulting oligopoly is tight.92   
 
 Consider various measures of concentration using the 
Herfendahl-Hirshman Index (HHI).93  Indexes below 1000 signal an 
                                                                                                                                   
justify a tentative conclusion that these are “at least plausibility significant.”  Talley, supra note 
1, at 43.   
 
88 See supra Part I.B.1. 
 
89 Talley, supra note 1, at 41.  Professor Talley observes that classical finance theory denies 
normative systemic significance to bankruptcy, which is simply a cash flow reallocation without 
value effects, but notes how this overlooks critical points such as employee dislocation.  Id. 
 
90 See GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 2. 
 
91 See id. at 12--15. 
 
92 See id. at 20--22 (indicating that four largest firms audit 99% of public company sales taken as 
aggregate, 97% of public companies with sales exceeding $250 million, and 78% of all public 
companies). 
 
93 HHI measures market concentration by summing the squares of each member firm’s size 
measured in terms of market share.  An illustrative short-hand formula determines HHI for n 
equal-size firms as:  n x (100 ÷ n) ÷ 2 = 10,000 ÷ n.  So, with one firm, HHI = 10,000; with five 
equal-sized firms, HHI = 2,000; with ten equal-sized firms, HHI = 1,000; and with 100 equal-
sized firms, HHI = 100.  See Dep’t of Justice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines 15 (1997) 
(explaining HHI). 
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unconcentrated market while those above 1800 signal a highly 
concentrated market.  Measuring market share in terms of sales, HHI 
was well below 1000 before the audit firm mergers began, it jumped 
to just under 1800 following a 1989 merger, rose above 2000 
following a 1998 merger, and climbed to 2500 upon Arthur 
Andersen’s dissolution in 2002. 94  Measuring market share in terms 
of numbers of clients, HHIs remain not much above 1000 for clients 
with sales less than $100 million, but for clients with sales greater 
than that, today’s HHI is well above 1800---indicating a highly 
concentrated market for the vast majority of large public 
enterprises.95 
 
 Despite increasing concentration, the GAO found no evidence 
of impaired price competition in the market for auditing services.96  It 
used a simulated pure-price competition model to conclude that 
existing market concentration is not inconsistent with a price-
competitive environment.97  In fact, much of the U.S. economy is 
concentrated yet, the GAO noted, remains price-competitive.  On the 
other hand, two points bear emphasizing.  First, the GAO’s analysis 
was conducted using data covering the period before Arthur 
Andersen’s demise.  Price competition may diminish with four rather 
than five participants.  Second, the lack of alternatives available to 
clients is a more direct concern for the auditing industry.98 
                                                                                                                                   
 
94 GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 18--20. 
 
95 Id.  
 
96 Id. at 25. 
 
97 Id. 
 
98 In addition, competition based on audit quality, although more difficult to asses than 
competition based on price, is important and concentration may reduce it.  See Sean M. 
O’Connor, Be Careful What you Wish For:  How Accountants and Congress Created the 
Problem of Auditor Independence, 45 B.C. L. Rev 741, 788 (2004) (arguing that it is “unlikely 
that an efficient market for reputational intermediaries--necessary to induce them to maintain 
their reputation through demonstrated integrity and objectivity--can exist in today’s highly 
concentrated market dominated by the Big Four accounting firms”); Prentice, Inevitability of a 
Strong SEC, supra note 72, at 786 (“Reputational constraints fail to restrain large accounting 
firms, both because large firms have a huge competitive advantage over second-tier firms that is 
difficult to squander and because as a group, large firms are lumped together such that one firm 
does not profit much from behaving better than its competitors.”). 
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 A tight oligopoly in the large company auditing market 
obviously limits service alternatives for large enterprises.  On the 
surface, with four audit firms, an enterprise engaging one for 
auditing and another for non-auditing services has but two choices if 
it were to fire either of those; with three audit firms, it would have 
but one choice.99  The reality is even worse than that.   
 
 The four large audit firms each boast special expertise in 
certain industries and lack the requisite specialization in others:  a 
single audit firm often dominates the market for clients in certain 
industries, and two firms command more than seventy percent of the 
reporting in numerous others.100  Clients in those industries may have 
nowhere else to go.  Thus, if an enterprise using Firm A for auditing 
and Firm B for consulting is in an industry where Firm A dominates 
and Firm C lacks expertise, then under the prevailing structure the 
choice may boil down to a single alternative or even none at all. 101 
 
 Nor can smaller audit firms fill the gap.  They lack the 
resources necessary to service the needs of many enterprises that 
routinely engage the large firms.102  They face other formidable 
barriers to entry as well.  For example, the GAO simulated a merger 
among the next five largest firms after the big four to see if a viable 
competitor could emerge.103  Those firms together commanded an 
                                                 
99 Talley, supra note 1, at 44--45. 
 
100 See id. at 35--36; see also Allen T. Craswell, Jere R. Francis & Stephen L. Taylor, Auditor 
Brand Name Reputations and Industry Specializations, 20 J. Acct. & Econ. 297 (1995); Chris E. 
Hogan & Debra C. Jeter, Industry Specialization by Auditors, 18 Auditing:  J. Prac. & Theory 1 
(1999) (study of trends driving auditor concentration from 1976 to 1993); The Future of 
Auditing:  Called to Account, supra note 12, at * (citing Public Accounting Report newsletter 
stating that, in 2004, three of the large firms  audited 97.3% of oil and gas industry and that two 
of them audited 88.2% of casino industry, with similar dominion in air transportation, coal, and 
other industries). 
 
101 See The Future of Auditing:  Called to Account, supra note 12, at * (providing example of 
Sun Microsystems, which uses three of the four big firms for non-audit services and fourth firm 
for audit services, and noting that Sun’s size renders all smaller firms inadequate). 
 
102 See GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 46--48 (concluding that 
smaller firms generally lack resources to audit large public companies). 
 
103 Id. app. 1 at 61--63.  GAO’s simulation used the model developed in Rajib Doogar & Robert 
F. Easley, Concentration Without Differentiation:  A New Look at the Determinants of Audit 
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8.6% market share in 2002.  Under the best-case simulation scenario 
(where the newly merged firm was maximally efficient measured by 
the staff-to-partner ratio), the result was an 11.2% market share.104  
In effect, the four largest firms, as a group, lack any competitors. 
 
 Among other barriers to entry, smaller firms cite litigation risk 
and difficulty obtaining insurance.105  While this is a routine lament 
in many U.S. industries,106 the concern bears some legitimacy across 
sectors, and certainly for the auditing industry.  The scandals 
epitomized by Arthur Andersen’s failure and Enron’s house of cards 
meant “insurance companies saw increased risk and uncertainty from 
insuring firms that audited public companies.”107 Premiums 
skyrocketed and coverage contracted.108  While acute for small audit 
firms, the large four firms confront similar difficulties.109 
 
 However, it is not certain whether such concentration and 
barriers to entry are entirely lamentable.  Scholars disagree about the 
                                                                                                                                   
Market Concentration, 25 J. Acct. & Econ. 235 (1998). 
 
104 GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 50--51.  Under moderate 
efficiency assumptions, resulting shares ranged from 4.5% to 6.4% ---a reduction in total market 
share!  Id. 
 
105 Id. at 49. 
 
106  See, e.g., Donald P. Judges, Of Rocks and Hard Places:  The Value of Risk Choice,  42 
Emory L.J. 1, 93--101 (1993) (discussing statutory provisions limiting potential liability for ski 
area and rock climbing operators); Bryan A. Liang & LiLan Ren, Medical Liability Insurance 
and Damage Caps:  Getting Beyond Band Aids to Substantive Systems Treatment to Improve 
Quality and Safety in Healthcare, 30 Am. J.L. & Med. 501, 514--17 (2004) (discussing effects of 
high costs of medical malpractice insurance on physician practice); W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia 
Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liability Reform, 24 J. Legal Stud. 463, 
463--64 (1995) (describing negative trends in healthcare associated with rising medical 
malpractice premiums). 
 
107 GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 49.  The others were Global 
Crossing Ltd.; Qwest Communications International Inc.; and WorldCom, Inc.  See 
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn, supra note 44, at 924--25.  Professor Talley notes how, 
due to such increased costs, most large audit firms currently rely upon self-insurance to address 
liability exposure rather than use third-party liability insurance.  Talley, supra note 1, at 2.  Part 
III, infra, inquires into insurance matters, including distinguishing between liability insurance 
and other forms, such as financial statement insurance. 
 
108 GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 49. 
 
109 Id. 
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optimal number of audit firms for given markets.  Some evidence 
indicates that concentration produces specialization that reduces 
financial misstatement risk. 110  Other research finds that having a 
large number of audit firms reduces the risk of a dominant firm 
establishing accounting policies that could spawn inferior financial 
reporting.111  However too many client alternatives can enable 
clients, through opinion shopping, to pressure auditors into solicitude 
that they should resist.112 
 
 Debates that are similarly unresolved concern the benefits or 
costs of having enterprises rotate their auditors.  One tradeoff is 
between developing client-specific expertise that liberates auditors 
from reliance on managerial assertions versus developing a 
complacent attitude that diminishes professional skepticism.113  
Another factor is the effect of audit firm rotation on the ability of 
smaller firms to compete with the four large firms.114  In any event, 
auditor rotation is a policy option only if a minimum number of 
suitable firms exist or could enter into competitive positions.115  
                                                 
110 Joseph V. Carcello & Albert L. Nagy, Auditor Industry Specialization and Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting, in Proceedings of the 2002 Deloitte & Touche/University of Kansas 
Auditing Symposium [pin], [pin] (James Heintz ed., date). 
 
111 GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 36. 
 
112 Id. 
 
113 See Joseph V. Carcello & Albert L. Nagy, Audit Firm Tenure and Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting, 23 Auditing:  J. Prac. & Theory 55 (2004) (finding no evidence that audit tenures 
over eight years increases fraudulent reporting and that fraudulent financial reporting is more 
likely in first three years of auditor-client relationship); Van E. Johnson, Inder K. Khurana & J. 
Kenneth Reynolds, Audit-Firm Tenure and the Quality of Financial Reports, 19 Contemp. Acct. 
Res. 637 (2002) (finding no evidence of inferior financial reports for enterprises with audit firm 
tenures of nine or more years as compared to evidence of lower quality reports for enterprises 
with tenures from two to eight years); Larry R. Davis, Billy Soo & Gregory M. Trompeter, 
Auditor Tenure and the Ability to Meet or Beat Earnings Forecasts (treating long tenure as 
fifteen or more years and finding reporting quality deterioration) (manuscript on file with 
author). 
 
114 See Benito Arrunada, Mandatory Rotation of Company Auditors:  A Critical Examination, 17 
Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 31, 41--44 (1997) (evaluating competitive implications of mandatory 
rotation of auditors proposal); The Future of Auditing:  Called to Account, supra note 12, at 71 
(quoting Duke University Law School Professor James Cox as suggesting that mandatory audit 
firm rotation could improve ability of smaller firms to compete with four large audit firms). 
 
115 See U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-04-216, Public Accounting Firms:  
Required Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation 41--42 (2003). 
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 All such points of academic debate may be contestable, but 
only within a range of audit firm numbers.  When there are eight, or 
five, or even four firms, debaters legitimately can contend that eight, 
five, or four is the more or less ideal number.  It strains credulity to 
contend that three is optimal---or two or one.  At that level, debate 
dissolves and the question is whether three (or two or one) under the 
current audit industry structure is merely tolerable or even 
sustainable.  In this view, the magnitude of a single additional audit 
firm exiting the market is essentially overwhelming.  
 
 2.  Governmental Response. --- So, wholly apart from the 
Audit Industry RTR Model’s probability assessments, momentous 
policy issues appear from considering the existing structure of the 
auditing industry, amplified considerably by the prospect of further 
diminution.  Upon recognizing this risk, the GAO prescribed 
developing policies that would prevent further industry 
consolidation.116  With Arthur Andersen’s dissolution evidently in 
mind, it suggested balancing firm and individual responsibility, 
holding people---not firms---liable for harms.117  Moreover, the GAO 
emphasized, policymakers cannot allow the large audit firms to 
believe that they are too big to fail.118  However, preventing such a 
                                                                                                                                   
 
116 See GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 52. 
 
117 Id. at 53.  Imposing liability on individuals rather than on firms addresses how individuals 
may have lesser reputation-based incentives, compared to firms, to detect and deter client error 
or deception.  See Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and 
Enron, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 394, 408 (2004) (arguing that although it was irrational for Arthur 
Andersen to become captured by Enron it may not have seemed irrational to individual partners 
because Enron was their only client); Richard W. Painter, Convergence and Competition in 
Rules Governing Lawyers and Auditors, 29 Iowa J. Corp. L. 397, 411 (2004) (“[I]ndividual 
partners in the firm may still be interested in getting and keeping a lucrative but risky client--
even if it harms the firm as a whole . . . .”); Larry E. Ribstein, SarbOx: The Road to Nirvana, 
2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 279, 288 [hereinafter Ribstein, SarbOx] (suggesting that while an audit 
firm has “an interest in motivating its members to build the firm’s reputation, its members’ 
careers may depend on pleasing the client executives”).  The Department of Justice followed this 
advice in 2005 by opting to forego indicting KPMG and to pursue instead individual defendants.  
Its strategy backfired when the pressure it applied to KPMG led it to violate the individual 
defendants’ constitutional rights.  United States v. Stein, No. 05 CR 00888(LAK)(ECF), 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42915 (S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2006). 
 
118 GAO, Study on Audit Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 53. 
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belief may be difficult, given conflicting history, policy analysis, and 
how even a small number of individuals holding the belief could 
trigger calamity. 
 
 As to conflicting guidance from history, governmental 
flirtations with the too big to fail policy are intermittent.  
Government willingly bought into the bailout business in the 1970s 
and 1980s;119 then this habit dissipated in the early 1990s when 
Congress restricted the policy for banks.120  Then again, the 
government orchestrated a bailout of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) in 1998.121  While the government refrained 
from preserving Arthur Andersen in 2002, many market participants 
and some policymakers later questioned the reticence.122  Whether 
related to that criticism or not, in 2005 the government refrained 
                                                 
119 An inchoate too big to fail policy emerged in the early 1970s when the federal government 
provided financial assistance to prevent the failure of Penn Central Transportation Co. and other 
railroads, as well as Lockheed Aircraft Corporation.  See Emergency Loan Guarantee Act of 
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-70, 85 Stat. 178 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1841--1852 (2000)) (providing 
assistance to Lockheed); William E. Thoms, Clear Track for Deregulation American Railroads, 
1970--1980, 12 Transp. L.J. 183, 195--205 (1982) (describing railroad bankruptcies and 
government action to maintain rail service).  The policy assumed greater force in the late 1970s 
with rescues of Chrysler Corporation and the City of New York.  See Chrysler Corporation Loan 
Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 93 Stat. 1324, 1324--35 (1980) (expired Dec. 31, 
1983); New York City Loan Guarantee Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-339, 92 Stat. 460 
(repealed/expired/superseded [date]); New York City Seasonal Financing Act of 1975, Pub. L. 
No. 94-143, 89 Stat. 797 (amended [?] [date]). 
 
120 The government’s formal too big to fail policy crystallized in banking regulation in the early 
1980s, when the Federal Reserve arranged the bailout of Continental Illinois.  See Arthur E. 
Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve?  The Potential Ris ks of Nationwide Banks, 77 
Iowa L. Rev. 957, 994 (1992).  This stance changed in the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Improvements Act of 1991, which established nonintervention as the basic rule.  12 
U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)--(E) (2000) (requiring FDIC to resolve banking issues using least cost 
resolution).  An exception requires the existence of “systemic risk” from failure, a conclusion 
that requires agreement of two-thirds of the boards of the FDIC and Federal Reserve plus the 
concurrence of the Secretary of the Treasury (in consultation with the President).  12 U.S.C. 
§ 1823(c)(4)(G). 
 
121 See Kevin Dowd, Too Big to Fail?  Long Term Capital Management and the Federal Reserve 
(Cato Inst., Paper No. 52, 1999) (describing Federal Reserve leadership in bailout of Long Term 
Capital Management and its impact). 
 
122 See, e.g., GAO, Study on Auditing Industry Consolidation, supra note 2, at 19 (“It is unclear 
whether and to what extent the Antitrust Division was consulted and to what extent DOJ’s 
Antitrust Division had input into the decision to criminally indict [Arthur] Andersen.”); The 
Future of Auditing:  Called to Account, supra note 12, at * (“Almost everyone agrees that 
[Arthur] Andersen’s collapse made the financial system more vulnerable.”). 
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from prosecuting a criminal indictment against KPMG although 
there was no question about the firm’s guilt. 
 
 As to policy analysis, on one hand, externality justifications 
for invoking the too big to fail doctrine may be inapplicable to 
auditing.  Such arguments made in the banking sector emphasize 
preventing runs on banks and spillover effects that disrupt credit 
flows.123  No such effects are likely in auditing.  On the other hand, 
an audit firm’s pending collapse likely would impair investor 
confidence and provoke clients to flee.  It is uncertain whether other 
firms could absorb fleeing clients swiftly.  Fear of a resulting stock 
market meltdown (the chief justification for LTCM’s rescue) could 
induce regulatory intervention.124  After all, second-order effects of a 
stock market meltdown include capital misallocation and panic that 
could resemble, on a different scale, runs on banks.   
 
 True, such concerns also accompanied Arthur Andersen’s 
pending demise, and yet the government allowed it to fail.  But the 
difference between four instead of five firms is less problematic than 
the difference would be between three instead of four firms.  Indeed, 
even with four firms, the current auditing market for large enterprises 
restricts client choices in possibly suboptimal ways.  And there is 
reason to suspect that the Department of Justice would not allow a 
merger between any of the four large firms.125  So, on balance, it 
would not be irrational for auditors to believe that the government 
simply would not allow three rather than at least four firms to 
dominate the industry.126   
 
                                                 
123 See Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation:  An Economic Analysis, 
77 Iowa L. Rev. 1083, 1105--06 (1992); Wilmarth, supra note 120, at 998--99. 
 
124 See Henry T.C. Hu, Faith and Magic:  Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality, 78 Tex. 
L. Rev. 777, 868--72 (2000); Mark E. Van Der Weide & Satish M. Kini, Subordinated Debt:  A 
Capital Markets Approach to Bank Regulation, 41 B.C. L. Rev. 195, 254 n. 196 (2000). 
 
125 Talley, supra note 1, at 44--45. 
 
126 Cf. The Future of Auditing:  Called to Account, supra note 12, at 71 (“[A] fear, shared by 
many, is that should another Big Four firm collapse, there is a real risk that the government 
would take over audits and that financial markets would suffer long-term harm.”). 
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 Moreover, such a belief can present moral hazard even if held 
by as few as a critical mass of team members on a single audit 
engagement.  To paraphrase President George W. Bush’s response to 
the emerging fiasco at Enron Corporation, it only takes a few bad 
apples to spoil the whole cart.  For support, individual team members 
can point to the reversal of the criminal conviction against Arthur 
Andersen and the dismissal of the criminal indictments against all 
individual defendants in the KPMG case.  Formal probabilities in the 
Audit Industry RTR Model aside, highly plausible cataclysmic risk 
scenarios are easy to imagine under the current industry structure. 
 
 Peril accompanies actual or potential government intervention 
to prevent failure of an institution deemed too big to fail.  For 
auditing, moral hazard means greater risk taking than markets alone 
would tolerate.127  This could lead to the kind of laxity that 
characterized much auditing behavior during the 1990s.128  Such 
laxity can impair the reliability of financial reporting.  It offsets, and 
could even negate, any benefits of more effective auditing and 
financial reporting otherwise achieved by the reforms contained in 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  A major concern, in other words, is that 
Arthur Andersen’s exit and KPMG’s survival may be doing more to 
impair audit quality than Sarbanes-Oxley is doing to improve it. 
 
 A secondary problem of rescuing large failing institutions is 
neglect of smaller institutions.  Government subsidization of large 
                                                 
127 See Gary H. Stern, The Too-Big-to-Fail Problem, Region, Sept. 1997, at 26.  Mr. Stern 
explains moral hazard as follows: 
 
Once a person or institution is insured, the insured has an incentive to take on 
more risk than otherwise.  This is why, for example, fire and auto insurance 
policies have deductibles.  With deductibles, the insured have more incentive 
to pick up old paint cans and drive cars more carefully.  The moral hazard 
problem is particularly severe in banking because of the lack of deductibles.  
Governments often provide 100 percent depositor protection, es pecially at 
large banks where a loss could have industry wide repercussions (a practice 
known as too-big-to-fail---TBTF). 
 
Id.; see also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 237, 272--75 
(1996) (noting that moral hazard arises any time one party’s behavior influences risk borne by 
another and using products liability as example).  
 
128 See supra notes 69--84 and accompanying text. 
 
 37 
organizations creates proportional disadvantages for the next tier of 
industry participants.129  In auditing, this further diminishes the 
ability of smaller firms to compete with the four large firms.  The 
governmental banking policy that restricts the use of the too big to 
fail doctrine130 reflects a prudence that could be appealing if applied 
to the auditing industry.  Such ex ante restrictions often are necessary 
to constrain regulatory inclinations amid crisis to rescue enterprises 
deemed too big to fail.131  Governmental temptation to rescue and the 
concomitant need for restraint evokes Homer’s Odyssey, when 
government must be “tied to the mast” to fight temptation to hear the 
“song of the Sirens.”132 
 
* * * 
 
 Neutralizing moral hazard from any too big to fail conceit at 
the four large audit firms requires creating credible alternatives to the 
existing auditing industry structure.133  Particularly appealing would 
be an alternative that also can improve existing audit quality, 
increase attention to catastrophic risk, and reduce industry 
concentration by lowering barriers to entry.  The following Part 
explores incremental reforms directed at improving audit quality by 
applying perspectives on catastrophic risk from complexity theory.  
The ensuing Part offers financial statement insurance as a 
                                                 
129 See Keith N. Hylton, Banks and Inner Cities:  Market and Regulatory Obstacles to 
Development Lending, 17 Yale J. on Reg. 197, 241 (2000) (discussing how too big to fail policy 
creates greater moral hazard in larger banks); Carrie Stradley Lavargna, Government-Sponsored 
Enterprises Are “Too Big to Fail”:  Balancing Public and Private Interests, 44 Hastings L.J. 991, 
1013 (1993) (discussing situation where FDIC did not bail out small bank but bailed out large 
bank two months later). 
 
130 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(A)--(E)(2000) (imposing limits on governmental authority to provide 
assistance to insured depository institutions).  
 
131 See Miller, supra note 123, at 1107--08.  
 
132 See Homer, The Odyssey 155 (S.O. Andrew trans., J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd. 1948). 
 
133 See Hu, supra note 124, at 873 (addressing bailout of Long Term Capital Management and 
suggesting that “one possible category of techniques that the Federal Reserve should contemplate 
is  to specifically and credibly forswear the use of possible tools to deal with a stock market 
crash”); Van Der Weide & Kini, supra note 124, at 254 (“In order to implement a successful 
market discipline approach to bank regulation, the federal government must credibly commit not 
to insure the losses of the relevant market participants.”). 
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revolutionary way to provide these steps and create just such a 
credible alternative to the existing industry structure. 
 
II.  Reform 
 
 A meaningful probability of near-term audit firm exit due to 
federal securities fraud class actions that Professor Talley explores is 
not entirely new.  For example, in 1992, total securities fraud 
litigation costs reportedly consumed fourteen percent of audit 
revenues (totaling $783 million, meaning potential loss exposure 
running into the billions of dollars).134  The magnitude is much 
higher, however, after the reduction in industry size to four large 
audit firms from six and, before then, eight.  With such a contraction, 
the moral hazard that exists when firms believe that they are too big 
to fail amplifies.  Accordingly, even if the probability of audit firm 
exit were low, the magnitude is so high that immediate policy 
attention is warranted.  
 
 Some low probability, high magnitude events may casually be 
referred to as worst case scenarios.  These often are dismissed, ex 
ante, as too remote to invest preventive resources (although, ex post, 
policymakers scurry to make the requisite investment).  This occurs 
in many contexts, including stock market trading (market crash of 
1987), airport security (terrorism of 2001), space exploration safety 
(Columbia shuttle disintegration in 2003), and artificial levy systems 
(hurricane destruction of New Orleans in 2005).  It could include 
risks of asteroid collisions with large cities135 and of large audit firms 
exiting the industry (Arthur Andersen’s exit in 2002; KPMG’s near 
exit in 2005). 
 
 Policy analysts may find it desirable to incorporate such risks 
in normative evaluations ex ante.  While analysts use standard tools 
                                                 
134 See Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 318 n. 51 (citing Private Litigation Under the 
Federal Securities Laws:  Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong. 103--431 (1993) (statement of Jake L. 
Netterville, Chairman of the Board, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants)). 
 
135 See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe:  Risk and Response 139--98 (2004); Richard A. Posner, 
Efficient Responses to Catastrophic Risk, 6 Chi. J. Int’l L. 511, 515 (2006). 
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such as the normal curve in statistical probability distributions, an 
increasingly large number of systems are known to behave in 
accordance with other probability distributions that require 
redefining the nature of the unexpected.  A relatively new field called 
complexity theory studies systems that obey such distributions.136  
The following discussion introduces this theory and considers how 
selected aspects of auditing may be fit for similar study. 
 
A.  Complexity Theory 
 
 In complexity theory, the remote becomes a more central focus 
than routine, expectable events.  Technically, complexity theory 
investigates the distinctive nonlinearities of dynamic systems.  These 
systems often can be modeled using traditional tools (such as 
equilibrium models or geometric equations) but certain outcomes are 
so sensitive to infinitesimally small changes in the initial conditions 
as to elude capture or prediction by those tools.  Manifestations of 
these peculiarities include probability distributions that do not follow 
a normal or bell-shaped curve but instead follow a “power law 
distribution.”137 
 
 Earthquakes illustrate this distribution:  numerous small 
quakes occur routinely but very large ones are rare and the 
distribution of very large quakes along the right tail of the 
distribution falls more slowly than under a normal distribution’s right 
tail. 138  In the auditing industry, one observes a large number of small 
                                                 
136 See Manfred Schroeder, Fractals, Chaos, Power Laws:  Minutes from an Infinite Paradise 
103--19 (1991). 
 
137 Power law models were developed in physics but related insights have been extended to 
inform policy challenges in numerous contexts, including environmental law and securities 
regulation.  See, e.g., Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The (Mis)Behavior of Markets (2004); Fred 
Bosselman, What Lawmakers Can Learn from Large-Scale Ecology, 17 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 
207, 224--25 (2002); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes:  The 
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 
(1994); J.B. Ruhl, Thinking of Environmental Law as a Complex Adaptive System:  How to 
Clean Up the Environment by Making a Mess of Environmental Law, 34 Hous. L. Rev. 933 
(1997). 
 
138 Other attributes of such distributions include absence of the normal curve’s peak and presence 
of a continuously decreasing curve capturing the coexistence of numerous small events alongside 
a small number of massive ones.  A stylized example of a population’s height distribution would 
show a majority of short creatures accompanied by occasional 100-foot tall specimens and the 
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liability judgments or settlements (in the one to ten million dollar 
range) and a very small number of very larges ones (in the range of 
more than one hundred million)---and the trailing off along the right 
tail may be slower than in normal distributions.  This is especially so 
if one uses a capacious sense of exit inducements, such as including 
criminal indictments, scandal-laden client disaffection, and 
confluences of these forces.  
 
 For power distributions, statistical properties are unusual.  
Whereas normal distributions sport finite expected values and 
variances, power distributions can have infinite expected values or 
infinite variance.139  As with any statistical measure, this has limits, 
such as the fact that these attributes may not hold true over the entire 
range of the data.  Accordingly, as with other statistical measures, 
these are approximations of reality rather than pure forms.  
 
 Despite these limitations, complexity theory can offer useful 
lessons for catastrophic risk, including for cataclysmic auditor 
liability---and audit firm exit---risk.  The next two subsections 
explore two particular lessons:  subsection II.B endorses using 
conservative and strategic audit procedures to enhance auditors’ 
reputation with managers for toughness and subsection II.C 
prescribes publishing worst-case scenario analyses in audit reports to 
improve the product that auditors provide to external users.   
 
B.  Internal Reputation 
 
 It is commonly said that an audit firm’s most valuable asset is 
a reputation for honesty.140  Third parties who rely on audit reports 
likely assume that auditors are honest with them, but an honest 
                                                                                                                                   
rare but real mile-high creature.  See Albert-László Barabási, Linked:  The New Science of 
Networks 67--68 (2002).  
 
139 See Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature 337--38 (1983).  
 
140 See DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.) (“An 
accountant’s greatest asset is its reputation for honesty, followed closely by its reputation for 
careful work.”); Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Agency Problems, Auditing, and the 
Theory of the Firm:  Some Evidence, 26 J.L. & Econ. 613, 621 (1983) (emphasizing external 
reputation concern as incentive for auditors to disclose known accounting deceptions). 
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auditor who cannot deter managerial sloppiness or aggression 
deserves little credit (or compensation) for her honesty.  More 
important than honesty, auditors must command a reputation, 
believed by management, for ruthlessly scouring managerial 
assertions and not allowing questionable reporting.141  Management 
will incline towards softening an auditor’s reputation for 
thoroughness and, when successful, be able to get away with less 
diligence and more aggression.142   
 
 Auditors earn reputations for toughness through traditional 
investigative auditing practices that require continuing investment to 
sustain.  During periods, such as the 1990s, when industry-wide 
laxity manifests, rebuilding that reputation requires significant 
additional investment.  This explains the renewed emphasis on 
auditor independence and is an important theoretical justification for 
the requirement, in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, that auditors audit 
internal control over financial reporting.143  When, as now, auditors 
face industry-unraveling consequences from laxity, complexity 
theory’s insights about catastrophic risk justify such investment.  
 
 1.  Traditional Auditing Practice. --- Brief background on 
traditional auditing practice puts these points in perspective.  The 
industry’s standard model defines audit risk as:  “the probability that 
an auditor may unknowingly fail to modify an opinion on financial 
statements that are materially misstated.”144  Audit risk is composed 
of three sub-risks:  (1) inherent risk is the susceptibility of an 
assertion (such as an account balance) to error that could be material, 
                                                 
141 See Srikant M. Datar & Michael Alles, The Formation and Role of Reputation and Litigation 
in the Auditor-Manager Relationship, 4 J. Acct. Auditing & Fin. 401 (1999) (studying formation 
and meaning of auditors’ internal reputations with managers). 
 
142 See William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 Duke L.J. 439, 
473 (2003) (“Management will always prefer an auditor with a reputation for flexibility 
respecting aggressive treatments and avoid an auditor with a reputation for conservative 
probity.”); Robert Libby et al., Experimental Research in Financial Accounting, 27 Acct. Org. & 
Soc’y 775, 781--83 (2002); Mark Nelson & Hun-Tong Tan, Judgment and Decision Making 
Research in Auditing 33--38 (Mar. 25, 2005), at http://ssrn.com/abstract=761706 (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing auditor-client interactions). 
 
143 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2002). 
 
 
144 David N. Ricchiute, Auditing and Assurance Services 45 (7th ed. 2003). 
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assuming there is no related internal control; (2) control risk is the 
likelihood that error could occur and not be prevented or detected by 
internal control; and (3) detection risk is the likelihood that error 
could occur and not be detected by the auditor’s procedures.145 
 
 Audit risk is the product of the three risk types, expressed 
formally as the “audit risk” model:  AR = IR x CR x DR.146  Auditors 
evaluate inherent risk (IR) and control risk (CR) and then solve this 
equation for an acceptable level of detection risk (DR).147  An 
acceptable level of detection risk hinges, in turn, on the desired level 
of confidence to support an unqualified opinion. 148  The confidence 
level is the likelihood that audit procedures did not fail.  The 
requisite confidence level depends, further still, on magnitude, 
usually meaning materiality.  The standard of materiality used in 
auditing is akin to that used in both securities law and financial 
accounting.  All treat as material matters that a reasonable person 
would consider important in making a decision based on some 
information base.149 
 
                                                 
145 Id. at 46--48; see also Jens Wüstemann, Evaluation and Response to Risk in International 
Accounting and Audit Systems:  Framework and German Experiences, 29 J. Corp. L. 449, 451 
(2004). 
 
146 Ricchiute, supra note 144, at 46--48; Wüstemann, supra note 145, at 451--52. 
 
147 Rewriting the equation in these terms yields:  DR = AR ÷ (IR x CR). This makes detection 
risk (DR) the dependent variable, controlled by mastering inherent risk and control risk.  
Wüstemann, supra note 145, at 451--52. 
 
148 Auditors formalize that confidence level as:  CL = 1 ÷ DR.  Id. 
 
149 See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976) (interpreting materiality 
under federal securities laws); Objectives of Fin. Reporting by Bus. Enters., Statement of 
Accounting Concepts No. 2, paras. 123--132 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1978) (explaining 
materiality concept in accounting).  Practitioners posit an inverse relationship between audit risk 
and materiality.  Ricchiute, supra note 144, at 50.  Planning an audit requires estimating 
materiality.  The auditing industry publishes decision aids relating audit risk to materiality and 
implied requisite audit effort.  See, e.g., Audit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an Audit, 
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 107 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 2006) 
(presenting information on minimum sample sizes for tests of internal control given tolerate 
deviation rates and expected population deviation rates).  It also invokes rules of thumb, the 
commonest of which relates to an item’s effect on net income.  Effects less than five percent are 
seen as unlikely to be material and those greater than ten percent are seen as likely to be material.  
See, e.g., SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 64 Fed. Reg. 45,150 (1999). 
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 Under this model,  auditors engage in exercises designed to 
gather sufficient information to decide whether they are justified in 
issuing an unqualified report on financial statements (that they fairly 
present performance and condition in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP)).150  Threshold testing 
probes the capacity of internal control over financial reporting to 
catch errors or fraud; further substantive tests seek to detect material 
misstatements or identify assertions likely to contain them.151  
Auditors use statistical sampling, random testing, and similar 
investigative techniques to form their opinion.  In addition to 
substantive tests of financial statement assertions, auditors cross-
examine managers, reason from recognized principles and 
relationships, and rely upon intuition. 
 
 Auditors always face uncertainty about whether they have 
sufficient evidence to issue an unqualified audit report.  Under the 
traditional audit risk model, an auditor designs an audit plan to 
reduce risk to an acceptable level.  When initial testing exposes 
potentially material errors or deceptions, auditors expand the scope 
of substantive testing and/or managerial interrogation.  Managers 
who are aware of pending tests and probing are discouraged from 
accounting aggression and stimulated to diligence; those aware that 
auditors are unlikely to test or probe intensively can indulge 
temptations to cheat or be careless. 
 
 These realities explain why official auditing standards require 
auditors to seal gaps in their knowledge by adopting the fundamental 
habit of professional skepticism.152  This involves routinely second 
                                                 
150 See Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 411 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub. 
Accountants 2001). 
 
151 Substantive tests are of two types:  (1) “tests of detail” are designed to detect material 
misstatements in accounts and (2) “analytical procedures” are evaluations of data drawing on 
comparisons such as in relevant trends, baselines, or forecasts.  Ricchiute, supra note 144, at 45. 
 
152 See Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 508 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. 
Accountants 2001); Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, Statement of Fin. 
Accounting Standards No. 82 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1997) (“ Due professional care 
requires the auditor to exercise professional skepticism---that is, an attitude that includes a 
questioning mind and critical assessment of audit evidence.”); see also Vicky B. Heisman-
Hoffman et al., The Warning Signs of Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 182 J. Acct. 75, 75--77 
(1996) (assessing commonly cited cause of audit failure as auditors lacking awareness of 
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guessing managerial assertions and judgments.  Failure to adhere to 
the requirement exposes auditors to legal liability and sanction.153  
Since all the testing in the world could not uncover all mistakes or 
fraud, the indispensable auditing trait is a commanding reputation 
among managers for thoroughly rooting them out.154  That, more than 
the actual testing, is the value of auditing.155  Auditors suffered 
severe reputation damage during the 1990s, after compromising their 
independence from clients by joining in relationships with them.156  
These relationships increased managerial temptation for carelessness 
and deception. 
 
 2.  Rebuilding Reputation --- Complexity theory endorses the 
conservative testing and skepticism at the heart of the audit risk 
model and traditional practice---and supports expanding methods in 
two main ways.  First, it offers a defense of the controversial 
procedures mandated in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that require auditors 
to provide separate testing of and opinions upon the effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting.157  These exercises involve 
comprehensive examination of all procedures and policies governing 
                                                                                                                                   
warning signs that could be uncovered by applying requisite professional skepticism).  
 
153 See, e.g., SEC v. KPMG LLP, SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 2379 
(Feb. 22, 2006) (failure to exercise professional skepticism in connection with failed audits of 
Xerox Corp.); In re Deloitte & Touche LLP, SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement 
Release No. 2237 (Apr. 26, 2005) (failure to exercise professional skepticism in connection with 
failed audits of Adelphia Communications Corp.); In re PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, SEC 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No. 1787 (May 22, 2003) (failure to exercise 
professional skepticism in connection with failed audits of SmarTalk TeleServices Inc.). 
 
154 See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud:  A Critique of 
the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. Corp. L. 1, 31 (2002) [hereinafter Ribstein, Market] 
(“[T]he . . . serious issue is whether even strong regulation will change auditors’ practical ability 
to find corporate fraud when determined corporate insiders want to hide it.”).   
 
155 It is therefore incomplete to say that auditors earn their keep by “renting their reputations.”  
See Reinier Kraakman, Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 
J.L. Econ. & Org. 53, 93--94 (1986).  This viewpoint also makes less relevant the behavioral 
critique of the honesty proposition that attempts to explain how “irrational” auditors might 
jeopardize their external reputations for honesty and diligence unwittingly.  See Robert F. 
Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor:  A Behavioral Insight into Securities Fraud 
Litigation, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 133, 141--42 (2000).   
 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 69--84. 
 
157 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2002).  
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the internal processing of financial information and production of 
financial statements.158  Auditors now provide written reports on 
internal control, including publicly disclosing and explaining 
material weaknesses in it.   
 
 Many analysts criticize these new procedures as unnecessary 
and too costly.159  Complexity theory offers a different view that 
supports proponents of these exercises.  The procedures are 
necessary to rebuild auditors’ reputations for toughness, and are cost-
effective given how infirmities in these reputations pose risks of 
audit failure with concomitant risk of audit firm exit that could 
unravel the industry. 
 
 Complexity theory prescribes a conservative approach to risk--
-probably more conservative than traditional auditing practice.  In 
auditing, this could mean identifying and addressing all audit risk 
components necessary to justify issuing an unqualified report.  
Benefits arise from making managers aware of such procedures to 
increase the deterrent function of auditing.  The ultimate payoff is to 
eliminate the cataclysmic risk of audit failure that could induce audit 
firm exit.  But costs of eliminating this risk are extraordinary, and 
may be prohibitive. 
 
 Costs of undertaking such conservative procedures stem from 
taking steps that are strictly unnecessary in the sense that the 
underlying data ultimately support the existing financial statement 
assertions (call these “safe zones”).160  By so expanding an audit’s 
scope to test areas wrongly supposed to be dangerous---false 
positives---the auditor can reduce the chances of missing real danger 
zones---true positives.  A measure of conservatism is the ratio of true 
                                                 
158 Id.  For an attempt to provide a comprehensive description of the requirements, see Lawrence 
A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System:  Control Disclosure, 
Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 Hastings L.J. 1449 (2004). 
 
159 See, e.g., William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley:  The Irony of 
“Going Private,” 55 Emory L.J. 141, 147 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 Yale L.J. 1521, 1587--88 (2005). 
 
160 Cf. Daniel A. Farber, Probabilities Behaving Badly:  Complexity Theory and Environmental 
Uncertainty, 37 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 145, 160--61 (2003) (using these concepts to develop model 
for environmental law). 
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positives to false positives.  A one-to-one ratio means half the 
inquiries are danger zones and half are safe zones; a one-to-four ratio 
means that only a fifth were real danger zones and others tested as 
safe zones.  Conservative procedures over audit, but minimize the 
chance of missing a real danger, and suffering the consequent 
cataclysmic loss.   
 
 The new mandatory audits of internal control are a substitute 
for such comprehensive scouring but furnish much of the same 
function at less cost.  Some prescribed steps are not strictly necessary 
in that they involve testing many more safe zones than danger zones.  
But they provide two benefits.  First, they vastly reduce the chances 
of failing to identify danger zones.  These exercises have identified 
numerous control weaknesses and have produced financial 
restatements showing that these steps enable auditors to exercise 
their ability to pressure management into more faithful reporting.161  
Second, this manifest ability reflects that auditors are regaining a 
reputation with management for toughness. 
 
 Costs of auditing internal control over financial reporting are 
nevertheless significant.162  Some speculate that this is a product of 
auditors performing excessive work that is, in turn, motivated by fear 
of litigation.163  While possible, the investment’s instrumental value 
is principally a way to rebuild auditors’ impaired reputations for 
toughness versus management.  Formal audits and opinions on 
internal control are far more conservative than the limited testing of 
internal control that auditors performed under the traditional audit 
risk model.  That conservatism is justified, under complexity theory, 
given the staggering systemic consequences that audit firm exit 
poses.   
                                                 
161 See Weili Ge & Sarah McVay, The Disclosure of Material Weaknesses in Internal Control 
After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 19 Acct. Horizons 137 (2005) (noting sample of 261 companies 
disclosing material weaknesses, most of which reflect lack of resource commitment to 
accounting controls). 
 
162 See Susan W. Eldridge & Burch T. Kealey, SOX Costs:  Auditor Attestation Under Section 
404 (Univ. of Neb., Working Paper No. *, 2005) (noting that auditing fees paid by sample of 97 
companies increased, on average, from $3.5 million to $5.8 million, attributed to section 404 
compliance costs). 
 
163 See Pritchard, supra note 79, at 21. 
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 Consider an analogy from aviation security. 164  In this context, 
the risk distribution does not follow a bell curve but resembles a 
power curve:  Nearly all passengers pose no risk while a tiny few 
threaten catastrophic loss.  Security personnel must regularly decide 
whether to permit passengers through a security checkpoint 
(equivalent to issuing an unqualified audit report).  Security 
procedures must develop a reputation for interdiction to deter 
hijacking or terrorist attempts.  Doing so requires a large number of 
stoppages.   
 
 While any screening procedure inconveniences some safe 
passengers, catching a single dangerous one justifies a large number 
of stoppages.  Stopping all passengers is impractical but stopping 
vastly more safe than dangerous ones is necessary because the 
greater the stoppage rate, the greater the chances of catching 
dangerous passengers.  In auditing, expanding audit procedures---
including formal audits of and opinions on internal control---can be 
justified to reduce the chances of failing to identify danger zones, 
despite the cost of exploring what turn out to be safe zones.   
 
 The costs of expanded testing of one zone may deprive 
“gatekeepers” (whether airport security or auditors) of resources to 
expand testing in another.  In airports, stopping one passenger may 
mean the next one goes through unchecked.  The latter may be a 
danger, yet on board he or she goes.  But the chances that a randomly 
selected passenger is a danger are lower than the chances that a 
hijacker or terrorist appears among a larger group of stopped 
passengers.  As a result, the costs of letting an untested passenger 
through are lower than the benefits of testing the larger group.  
Moreover, having invested in a reputation for toughness that deters, 
resources are liberated for reallocation. 
 
 Of course, any security or investigative technique can be made 
more conservative when performing more procedures is possible, as 
with airport security and auditing.  This  raises a second set of 
                                                 
164 See Farber, supra note 160, at 162--63 (providing basis for this analogy). 
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improvements in auditing that complexity theory supports in the area 
of strategic detection.  Performing the maximum possible number of 
procedures is not likely a prudent method, even if extensive testing 
increases both deterrence and the chance of detection.  In airport 
security, it is necessary to use strategic methods of identifying and 
stopping particularly high-risk passengers, such as those named on 
governmental watch lists. 
 
 For auditing, auditors must supplement expanded testing by 
deploying strategic methods of detection that demonstrate to 
managers that even the cleverest schemes are unlikely to succeed.  
This is the theory behind innovations developed by auditing scholars 
in recent years.  These prescribe that auditors develop refined tools to 
aid in deciding when to expand testing to investigate for deception.  
For example, scholars explore how weak internal control can signal 
high fraud risk but, unless auditors use strategic procedures that 
distinguish error from fraud, they will treat discrepancies as due to 
error and allow fraud to go undetected.165  Strategic reasoning is 
particularly productive in high-risk environments.166  Complexity 
theory’s prescriptions for broad-gauged screening to avert 
catastrophic loss add support to the analytical arguments these 
scholars mount for a strategic approach to auditing.  
 
 To summarize, the possibility that auditor liability risk may 
resemble a power law distribution means that missing true positives 
can be cataclysmic.  True, costs of expanding an audit for a client or 
context may mean impairing resources to expand audits for others.  
But expanded---and more strategic---testing reduces cataclysmic risk.  
Such methods strengthen auditors’ reputations among managers for 
                                                 
165 See Dennis H. Caplan, Internal Control and the Detection of Management Fraud, 37 J. Acct. 
Res. 101, 101 (1999). 
 
166 See, e.g., Stephen K. Asare & Arnold M. Wright, The Effectiveness of Alternative Risk 
Assessment and Program Planning Tools in a Fraud Setting, 21 Contemp. Acct. Res. 325 passim 
(2004) (questioning effectiveness of standard audit tools in context of fraud and calling for 
strategic reasoning methods in high-risk contexts); T. Jeffrey Wilks & Mark F. Zimbelman, 
Using Game Theory and Strategic Reasoning Concepts to Prevent and Detect Fraud, 18 Acct. 
Horizons 173, 173--74 (2004) (urging change in current auditing standards and developing tools 
useful in performing critical audit tasks). 
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toughness, creating a deterrent effect that ultimately would permit 
less testing. 
 
 While audits of internal control help, most aspects of 
traditional auditing practice remain unaffected by the reforms begun 
in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and PCAOB’s ensuing standard setting.167  
For example, traditional auditing practice, and its audit risk model, is 
designed within a framework of concluding whether an unqualified 
audit report can be issued or not.  The practice is not geared toward 
assessing the relative integrity of individual or overall financial 
statement assertions.  This raises the second broad lesson for auditing 
from complexity theory, concerning external information that 
auditors generate, including worst case scenarios.  
 
C.  External Information 
 
 Scholars debate whether effective alternative means of 
communicating accounting information are underutilized.168  After 
all, auditors provide no specific assessments of how reliable a 
particular set of financial statements are when compared to others.  
Complexity theory suggests that auditors could provide more useful 
information by developing tools that assess and publicize worst case 
scenarios.  This can be done by creating more tailored audit reports 
than presently exist.  
 
 1.  Monotonic Audit Reports. --- The standard form of an 
unqualified audit report contains three prescribed paragraphs.169  
                                                 
167 See Charlie Cullinan, Enron as a Symptom of Audit Process Breakdown:  Can the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act Cure the Disease?, 15 Critical Persp. Acct. 853, 861--62 (2004) (showing how 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s reforms are directed heavily towards auditor independence with 
insufficient attention paid to critical steps in auditing process shown to contribute to audit 
failures). 
 
168 For a view contrary to that suggested here, see, e.g., Joseph V. Carcello et al., Auditors’ 
Reporting Options and Client Disclosure, 18 Res. Acct. Reg. (2005) (examining one context in 
which such options had been restricted and concluding that fewer auditor options did not impair 
enterprise disclosure). 
 
169 Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 508 (Am. Inst. Certified Pub. 
Accountants 2001) (“The auditor’s standard report identifies the financial statements audited in 
an opening . . . paragraph, describes the nature of an audit in a scope paragraph, and expresses 
the auditor’s opinion in a separate paragraph.”).  
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Each year, more than 90% of audit reports for public companies 
receive this standard form of auditor blessing.170  These reports sing a 
single tune for the financial statements of a regional restaurant chain 
as for those of a multinational conglomerate and every shape and size 
of enterprise in between.  To use an academic analogy, auditors 
grade financial statements on a pass/fail basis---the approach taken to 
non-competitive school course work---and all but a handful pass. 
 
 As for the small minority of financial statements that do not 
pass, auditing industry standards allow for a limited variety of 
likewise standardized modified reports (currently limited to 
“qualified” or “adverse”).171  An even rarer subset of the population 
of audit reports expresses a qualification as to whether an enterprise 
is capable of continuing as a “going concern,” and these, notoriously, 
predict only half of the actual observed bankruptcies.172   
 
 Two important, but still modest, recent improvements in 
communicating accounting information have been made.  First, SEC 
regulations require narrative disclosure concerning critical 
accounting policies.173  This innovation, enacted as the accounting 
scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s were brewing, requires 
detailed disclosure as to areas where assumptions and judgments 
                                                 
170 See Willekens, supra note 83. 
 
171 See Codification of Statements on Auditing Standards, AU § 508 (listing alternatives to 
standard audit report). 
 
172 See Kannan Raghunandan & Dasaratha V. Rama, Audit Reports for Companies in Financial 
Distress:  Before and After SAS No. 59, 14 Auditing:  J. Prac. & Theory 50, 51 (1995) 
(summarizing prior studies).  Auditors routinely fail to provide going-concern warnings unless 
the signs of impending doom are painfully obvious.  Id. at 58.  For example, no going-concern 
opinion appeared ahead of nearly half the 228 bankruptcies occurring from January 2001 to June 
2002, even though afflicted enterprises showed telltale warning signs:  negative working capital, 
negative retained earnings, and net income loss.  See Weiss Ratings, Inc., The Worsening Crisis 
of Confidence on Wall Street:  The Role of Auditing Firms 7 & tbl.4 (2002); see also Marshall 
A. Geiger & K. Raghunandan, Going-Concern Opinions in the “New” Legal Environment, 16 
Acct. Horizons 17, 24 (2002) (finding auditors less likely to issue going-concern reports to 
stressed companies in 2000 than in 1992). 
 
173 See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 8350, Exchange Act Release 
No. 48,960, 68 Fed. Reg. 75,056, 75,064--65 (Dec. 9, 2003); Cautionary Advice Regarding 
Disclosure About Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release 8040, Exchange Act 
Release No. 45,149, 66 Fed. Reg. 65,013, 65,013--14 (Dec. 9, 2001). 
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expose an enterprise’s financial statements to particular volatility or 
variability.174  
 
 Such sensitivity disclosure can give financial statement users a 
basis for gauging the reliability of those financial statements, 
including some clues concerning worst case scenarios.  While 
helpful, this disclosure is management’s responsibility and not 
subject to the ordinary financial statement audit.175  As company 
specific narrative, moreover, it is not easily rendered into an 
objective form that enables intercompany comparisons. 
 
 Second, the new reports on internal control over financial 
reporting aim in the same direction as worst case scenario analysis.176  
They serve, in part, as an early warning system to external users 
about the reliability of given financial statements.  When auditors 
determine that a material control weakness exists (one posing a 
more-than-remote risk of material financial misstatements), their 
report must describe the weakness and give “specific information” 
about “its actual and potential effect on the presentation of the 
company’s financial statements issued during [its] existence.”177  
                                                 
174 See Commission Guidance Regarding Management’s Discussion and Analysis of Financial 
Condition and Results of Operations, 68 Fed. Reg. at 75,056--57, 75,062--63, 75,065 
(referencing variability); Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting 
Policies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,013 (“[W]e believe it is appropriate to alert companies to the need 
for greater investor awareness of the sensitivity of financial statements to the methods, 
assump tions, and estimates underlying their preparation.”). 
 
175 See SEC Regulation S-K, Item 303, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2006) (indicating that management 
is responsible for providing MD&A disclosure).  Auditors do participate in the process of 
formulating the MD&A disclosure.  See Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical 
Accounting Policies, 66 Fed. Reg. at 65,013 (“As part of the normal audit process, auditors must 
obtain an understanding of management’s judgments in selecting and applying accounting 
principles and methods.  Special attention to the most critical accounting policies will enhance 
the effectiveness of this process.”).  Auditors may provide limited written assurance on MD&A 
disclosure.  See Disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis About the Application of 
Critical Accounting Policies, Securities Act Release No. 8098, Exchange Act Release No. 
45,907, 67 Fed. Reg. 35,634 & n.100 (May 2, 2002).  
 
176 See Management’s Reports on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and Certification of 
Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act Release No. 8238, Exchange Act 
Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,068, 68 Fed. Reg. 36,636 (June 
18, 2003). 
 
177 See Auditing and Related Prof’l Practice Standards, Auditing Standard No. 2, para. 176 (Pub. 
Co. Accounting Oversight Bd. 2004). 
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Again, while helpful, these reports are of limited utility.  Like 
financial audit reports, these generally say the same thing as a matter 
of form;178  they do not provide statistical or comparative information 
about financial statement reliability.   
 
 So, in financial reporting, there is no index of financial 
statement reliability.  Yet, in auditing, some risk always exists after 
conducting an expansive set of tests or obtaining extensive 
corroboration.  For example, a financial statement assertion that 
auditors flag for expanded testing may reveal itself as safe but in fact 
still be dangerous.  Despite the many degrees of relative danger and 
safety, auditors have no choice among the class of unqualified 
reports to provide any useful gradations, and internal control reports 
have provided only incrementally greater transparency.  
 
 Since no audits are alike and no financial statements exhibit 
exactly comparable reliability risk, all unqualified audit reports are 
not alike.  To reflect this, auditors could analyze and disclose grades 
on the overall reliability of given financial statements, resembling 
how teachers assign grades to students for their course work.  In 
auditing, grading financial statements would include generating and 
disclosing formal worst case scenarios for each.  Such granular 
assessments of accounting information would improve user 
understanding of an enterprise’s financial condition and performance 
and thus make capital allocation more efficient.  It also would exert 
competitive pressure on managers to achieve high grades for 
reliability, not just to report high profits. 
 
 2.  Graded Financial Statements --- To produce graded 
financial statements, auditors could adapt analytical methodologies 
used in corporate finance.  Credit rating agencies test a borrower’s 
capacity to pay its debts as they come in the ordinary course of 
business.179  They simulate varying firm-specific or economy-wide 
                                                 
178 Id. 
 
179 See Standard & Poor’s, Corporate Ratings Criteria 4 (2003), at 
http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/CorpCrit2004.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review).  I suggest adapting the analytical methodologies of rating agencies 
without opining upon that industry’s structure or integrity, which has been the subject of 
considerable criticism.  See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 Wash. U. 
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environments, including worst case scenarios, to test an enterprise’s 
ability to withstand a range of adversity, and then assign ratings (A, 
B, C and so on).  For auditing, an analogous exercise could assess the 
quality of reported figures and their reliability, assuming certain 
worst case scenarios of auditing error or accounting volatility.   
 
 Although worst case scenario analysis is conducted in 
numerous fields,180 it can be sufficiently controversial to warrant 
careful reflection.  Consider experience with it in environmental 
administrative law.  Regulations once required agencies, when 
preparing environmental impact statements, to include, amid 
uncertainty about the actual impact, “worst case analysis and an 
indication of the probability or improbability of its occurrence”181 
and later “reasonable projections of the worst possible consequences 
of a proposed action.”182 
 
 Critics complain that worst case scenario analysis is too 
pessimistic, that it entails a limitless exercise of conjuring up the 
ultimate worst case, and that expert risk management analysts shun 
the notion as of limited utility.183  Regulations were revised to 
jettison the express “worst” case or consequence requirement, and 
instead required evaluating reasonably foreseeable significant 
adverse impacts.  Yet “reasonably foreseeable” was defined to 
include effects bearing “catastrophic consequences, even if their 
probability of occurrence is low . . . . ”184  As a result, the implicit 
                                                                                                                                   
L.Q. 43, 64--71 (2004); Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?  Two 
Thumbs Down for the Credit Rating Agencies, 77 Wash. U. L.Q. 619, 654--81 (1999). 
 
180 See William J. Aceves, Predicting Chaos?  Using Scenarios to Inform Theory and Guide 
Practice, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 585, 589--91, 612--18 (2005). 
 
181 Farber, supra note 160, at 164 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (1984) (amended 1986)). 
 
182 Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ’s National Environmental Policy Act 
Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026, 18,032 (Mar. 23, 1981). 
 
183 See, e.g., Edward A. Fitzgerald, The Rise and Fall of Worst Case Analysis, 18 U. Dayton L. 
Rev. 1, 2--3 (1992) (reviewing cases as reaction to federal agency rejection of worst case 
scenario analysis); Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect:  Emotions, Worst Cases and Law, 112 
Yale L.J. 61, 96--98 (2002) (reviewing cases in broader context of worrying that people might 
worry too much about worst cases). 
184 Farber, supra note 160, at 166 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2003)). 
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directive remains to discuss low-probability but high-magnitude 
events---even if the rhetoric of “worst” is gone.185  
 
 The relationship of complexity theory and worst case scenario 
analysis gives rise to conflicting implications.186  First, power laws 
deny the existence of a genuine “worst case,” in that “ever-worse” 
cases always exist.  In other words, it is fair to criticize the entire 
concept (as an analytical construct) given the inherent arbitrariness of 
denominating a particular illustration as the worst.  But, second, as 
Professor Farber points out, “one characteristic of power laws is that 
the unlikely events on the right tail of the curve have a strong 
cumulative effect.”187  Concentrating on the probable can prevent 
appreciating the catastrophic.  Thus worst-case analysis provides an 
essential focus, compensating for the tendency to overlook the 
spectrum of worst case types.   
 
 Existing auditing practice does not reflect these insights.  As 
noted, a single large scale judgment could wipe out the auditing 
industry---not just a single firm---and even a dozen moderately sized 
judgments could have this effect.  This omission can be corrected by 
further refining the Audit Industry RTR Model.  In the preceding 
Part, I suggested refining the Audit Industry RTR Model by one 
degree of resolution to produce an Audit Firm RTR Model.188  This 
can be taken another degree of resolution further, to assess which 
clients are likely to populate the right tail for a given firm (call this 
an Audit Client RTR Model).  Auditors can adapt the audit risk 
model, either as it currently exists or as enhanced by the insights 
from complexity theory just described, to identify these clients.  
 
 Which clients are candidates for an RTR watch list?  In 
general, they are clients whose financial statements, if materially 
misstated, would produce cataclysmic auditor liability.  That includes 
                                                 
185 Id. at 167 (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332 (1989)). 
 
186 Id. at 167--168. 
 
187 Id. at 167. 
 
188 See supra notes 50--53 and accompanying text. 
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all very large clients, and could include a number of moderate to 
large clients if their combined size could produce, in aggregate, 
cataclysmic results.  Furthermore, auditors and researchers recognize 
certain high-risk accounting areas.  These can congregate in certain 
industries or types of business, which can pose greater accounting 
risk than others.189  Risk of accounting or auditing error also 
congregates in certain subject areas, such as standards regarding 
revenue or expense recognition.190  Given such variables, a formal 
model should be tractable to enable assessing Audit Client RTR as 
well as assign grades to financial statements more generally. 
 
 Informally, clients on the RTR watch list are those whose 
audits under the audit risk model (or conservative and strategic 
refinements of it) require expanded audit testing and exhibit other 
signals of high risk.  Auditors typically know who they are, as Arthur 
Andersen’s failed audits of Waste Management made 
overwhelmingly clear.191  Yet in the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
while auditors knew their “scary” clients, they imparted no such 
knowledge to the public.   
 
                                                 
189 See supra note 50. 
 
190 See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (2003).  This study of SEC enforcement actions indicated that the accounting areas most 
susceptible to misconduct are revenue recognition (126 cases) and expense recognition (101).  
Id. at 2.  Other areas are MD&A disclosure (43), related party disclosure (23), business 
combination accounting (23), non-monetary and roundtrip transactions (19), foreign payments 
(6), off-balance sheet arrangements (3), and improper use of non-GAAP financial measures (2).  
Id. at 6. 
 
191 See Arthur Andersen LLP, Exchange Act Release No. 44,444, Accounting and Auditing 
Enforcement Release No. 1405, 7 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 74,920 (June 19, 2001).  Arthur 
Andersen recognized that Waste Management engaged in “aggressive” accounting practices to 
enhance earnings and saw the company as a “high-risk client,” putting it on the firm’s 
“monitored client list---a list that it used to monitor clients that posed a significant audit risk to 
the Firm.”  Id.  The auditors routinely furnished company management with “proposed adjusting 
journal entries” (PAJEs) which the company equally routinely refused to accept or make, leading 
the audit firm to compromise by reclassifying the PAJEs according to categories of “must do,” 
reasonable to conservative.  Notably, Arthur Andersen considered Waste Management a “crown 
jewel” client; from its initial public offering in 1971 through 1997, every chief accounting officer 
at Waste Management was a former Arthur Andersen partner.  “During the 1990s, approximately 
14 former Arthur Andersen employees worked for Waste Management, most often in key 
financial and accounting positions.”  Id. 
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 Again, this is because, in major part, the standard audit report 
is always the same three paragraph document.  Such information 
asymmetries between the public and the auditors would be curtailed 
if auditors would capture and publicly disclose the resulting 
assessments in a formal index reflecting worst-case scenario 
analyses.  As explained next, financial statement insurance can 
supply an index to capture not only worst case scenarios, but also 
grades on financial statement reliability from strong to weak (A to 
F). 
 
III.  Revolution 
 
 A viable alternative to the auditing oligopoly is needed.  It 
must provide a credible threat to allow the exit of any of the four 
large firms that are on the brink of failure.  Ideally, the alternative 
would enable restructuring the industry in the short or medium term, 
before one of the four large firms faces exit.  This restructuring can 
be achieved by shifting from the existing model (involving clients 
paying auditors for audits backed by auditors’ balance sheets or 
liability insurance) to one where clients buy tailored insurance 
directly and insurers hire and supervise auditors.  Not incidentally, 
such a financial statement insurance approach would also improve 
audit quality, promote public assessment of worst case scenarios, and 
reduce barriers to entry that smaller firms currently face. 
 
 In previous articles, I recommended financial statement 
insurance (FSI) as a potentially useful method of improving the 
effectiveness of auditing.192  My endorsement was limited to the 
cautious proposal that legislation be enacted permitting companies, 
on a voluntary basis and with shareholder approval, to opt in to this 
method of backstopping financial statements.  Several factors now 
incline me to support making this a mandatory component of U.S. 
federal securities regulation. 
 
                                                 
192 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers:  The Financial Statement Insurance 
Alternative to Auditor Liability, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 413 (2004) [hereinafter Cunningham, 
Choosing Gatekeepers]; Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Model Financial Statement Insurance Act, 
11 Conn. Ins. L.J. 69 (2004) [hereinafter, Cunningham, A Model FSI Act]. 
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 First, scholarly and general interest in the concept of using FSI 
to reduce the frequency and magnitude of audit failure has grown.193  
Second, as Professor Talley’s Audit Industry RTR Model suggests, 
the probability of an audit firm exit is high; my own analysis 
indicates that the magnitude of such an event is enormous.  The 
resulting moral hazard may be impairing current audit quality and 
financial statement reliability even though considerable resources are 
being invested in internal control.  Third, these points imply that it is 
becoming urgent to develop credible alternatives to the existing 
auditing industry structure.  Yet none of the few available such 
alternatives are as attractive as FSI.194  Fourth, mandating FSI 
achieves auditing reform while preserving companies’ abilities to 
design approaches tailored to their needs.195 
 
 Accordingly, the following discussion endorses the adoption 
of mandatory FSI as the best way to restructure the auditing industry 
and thereby neutralize moral hazard and improve audit practice.  Part 
III.A exposes the peculiar limitations of using traditional liability and 
self-insurance techniques to backstop auditor liability.  Part III.B 
then discusses FSI, outlining its features and describing its 
                                                 
193 See Amy Shapiro, Who Pays the Auditor Calls the Tune?:  Auditing Regulation and Clients’ 
Incentives, 35 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1029, 1085--94 (2005) (suggesting FSI as one of several 
possible schemes for protecting investors from corporate fraud); David Skeel, Icarus in the 
Boardroom:  The Fundamental Flaws in Corporate America and Where They Came From 212--
14, 234 (2005) (same); see also Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper:  Why the SEC 
Should Mandate Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance 
Policies, 154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1147, 1148 (2006) ([*parenthetical]); Barney Jopson, An Industry 
Still Skulking in the Shadow of Enron, Fin. T. (July 27, 2006) at 12 ([*parenthetical]); Don A. 
Moore, SarbOx Doesn’t Go Far Enough, Bus. Wk. (Apr. 17, 2006), at 112 ([*parenthetical]). 
 
194 See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 192, at 423--27 (reviewing several 
alternative proposals and concluding that they are inferior to FSI); see also Stephen J. Choi & Jill 
E. Fisch, How to Fix Wall Street:  A Voucher Financing Proposal for Securities Intermediaries, 
113 Yale L.J. 269, 336--38 (2003) (proposing use of voucher financing to pay intermediaries 
such as securities analysts but expressly disclaiming concept for auditors because of auditing 
complexities that may impair its utility in that context); Ribstein, SarbOx, supra note 117, at 289 
(mentioning with little enthusiasm idea of having stock exchanges coordinate and compensate 
auditors) (citing Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, How the Quest for Efficiency Corroded the 
Market, Harv. Bus. Rev., July 2003, at 76)); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure 
Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 29 n.180 (suggesting but discounting 
possibility of having auditors paid through public funding). 
 
195 See id. at 467 n. 213 (providing chart summarizing framework and highlighting FSI policy 
provisions that can be tailored and disclosed); Cunningham, A Model FSI Act, supra note 192, at 
79--80 (outlining FSI policy provisions that can be tailored and disclosed). 
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advantages.  Finally, Part III.C compares FSI to other proposed 
reforms and responds to criticism of the proposal.  
 
A.  Limits of Liability Insurance 
 
 Traditionally, auditors could buy liability insurance to 
backstop their exposure to legal claims.  These policies are called 
errors and omissions (“E&O”) insurance.  When underwriting this 
form of coverage, insurers use general analytical methods not 
tailored to particular engagements or associated risks of audit failure.  
Rather, they apply conventional actuarial models that rely on risk 
pooling and diversification.196  These techniques reflect how liability 
insurance works when covered risks are substantially independent, so 
that coverage distributes and thus diversifies risk across participants 
pooled according to similar circumstances.197  Good examples are 
coverage for property owners facing earthquakes along the West 
coast of the United States or those on its Eastern seaboard facing risk 
of floods. 
 
 Two problems arise for using liability insurance in auditing.  
First, the risk pooling function will be diminished if the risk of 
financial misstatement lacks characteristics of independence.  This 
can occur when financial misstatement risks multiply during 
particular socioeconomic climates, congregate in certain industries, 
or cluster around certain innovations or practices.198  Such attributes 
can render related catastrophic events uninsurable.  They are akin to 
“acts of war” that insurance policies long have expressly excluded. 
                                                 
196 Anne Gron & Alan O. Sykes, Terrorism and Insurance Markets:  A Role for the Government 
as Insurer?  36 Ind. L. Rev. 447, 449 (2003) (noting that “essence of insurance is risk pooling 
and diversification, so that aggregate losses become predictable and insurers” can be confident 
that premiums plus income will cover loss payouts plus expenses). 
 
197 See Gron & Sykes, supra note 196, at 455 (noting that insurance policies typically do not 
cover damages caused by war because associated risks are too highly correlated); George L. 
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Reform, 59 Yale L.J. 1521, 1539--40 
(1987) (explaining fundamentals of insurance and imperative that covered risks be uncorrelated). 
 
198 See David B. Kahn & Gary S. Lawson, Who’s the Boss?  Controlling Auditor Incentives 
Through Random Selection, 53 Emory L.J. 391, 428--29 (2004) (arguing that financial 
misstatement risk is correlated since lawsuits are more likely during recessions). 
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These catastrophes do not satisfy the pooling and diversification 
model because losses are highly correlated across policyholders.199  
 
 In general, when losses associated with an event will tend to 
be highly correlated across policyholders---as with acts of war and 
perhaps certain high-risk audits---rational insurers using pooling and 
diversification strategies will shun them.200  Those offering the 
insurance will charge extraordinarily large premiums for doing so, 
which will be unappealing to the marketplace when premiums 
exceed a policy’s expected value.  The upshot:  Some losses are 
uninsurable.201  
 
 Recently, auditors have self-insured,202 which is often a signal 
that related risks are uninsurable.  However, Professor Talley’s 
analysis suggests that this is not a good explanation for current self-
insurance practice in the auditing industry.  Professor Talley’s 
frequency method generates out-of-sample predictions that provide a 
basis for assessing whether the data support the conclusion that the 
risks are uninsurable.203  Is the right-tail risk so thick that it cannot be 
diversified through third-party liability insurance markets?  The data 
do not support this conclusion:  Allowing that liability risk plays 
some role in the audit firm’s decision substantially to self-insure 
these risks, Professor Talley concludes that other factors play a role, 
including agency costs and adverse selection.204  
 
 These points lead to the second problem that arises when 
liability insurance is used in auditing---which also afflicts self-
                                                 
199 Gron & Sykes, supra note 196, at 455. 
 
200 Id. 
 
201 Id. (“Some potential losses are so catastrophic and non-diversifiable that no insurer will insure 
them for a price that customers will pay.”). 
 
202 See supra note 106. 
 
203 Professor Talley explains his conceptualization of liability risk as solely exogenous in order to 
assess “whether observed exposure events characterize the types of risk that theory would predict 
to be uninsurable.”  Talley, supra note 1, at 5. 
 
204 Id. at 4.  Nor can the possibility be ruled out that the current auditor insurance market is 
experiencing a transitory coverage shortage.  See Gron & Sykes, supra note 195, at 451--55. 
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insuring by the auditing industry.  Both liability insurance and self-
insurance pose a similar problem for auditing by relying upon 
general actuarial models of risk pooling and diversification. 205  Those 
actuarial models imply, wrongly under my analysis in Part I, 206 that 
auditors lack the ability to influence audit quality, financial statement 
reliability, or legal liability.  Instead, audits and audit risk are treated 
like earthquakes and floods.  But unlike earthquakes and floods, 
audits and audit risk are susceptible to human control.  Based on 
these faulty models, the E&O market and self-insurance currently 
operate off an inferior baseline of risk pooling and diversification.  
Thus, a superior approach would be tailored to particular audit 
engagements. 
 
 This conclusion invites another lesson from complexity theory.  
Contexts where casualty or liability insurance is unavailable may 
resemble a power law function in complexity theory.207  Power laws 
tend to exhibit large variances (even potentially infinite variance).  
For such distributions, insurance premiums may be higher than for 
conventional statistical distributions.208  But risk management, 
including through insurance, is critical for systems bearing 
significant social import, including the audit function’s role as the 
gateway to capital formation and allocation.  This means that the 
issue is less one of distributing risk using pooling and diversification 
and more one of allocating risk to their particular probable sources---
particular audit engagements.  
 
B.  Financial Statement Insurance 
 
 To summarize the concept of financial statement insurance, (1) 
companies buy insurance policies for a given premium and coverage 
mix, based on a preliminary insurer investigation, yielding a financial 
statement reliability index that is informative in ways that the opaque 
                                                 
205 It is as if, qua the Audit Industry RTR Model, the risks are fortuitous or random. 
 
206 See supra notes 68--84 and accompanying text. 
 
207 See supra notes 135--137 and accompanying text. 
 
208 Farber, supra note 160, at 170--71. 
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monotonic three-paragraph audit report is not; (2) the insurer engages 
and pays an auditor to conduct a full audit, making the auditor 
beholden to insurers, not clients; and (3) financial misstatements 
yield policy payouts up to the pre-determined policy coverage level.  
In addition to essentially refashioning the auditing industry by 
installing the insurance industry as a force, FSI contributes several 
structural advantages and potential competitive benefits. 
 
 1.  Structural Advantages --- First, conventional wisdom sees 
the conflict of interest that arises when clients pay auditors as an 
unavoidable fact of life.209  It is not.  With FSI, companies buy 
insurance policies and insurers hire and pay auditors to perform 
audits, making the auditor’s boss insurers, not management or audit 
committees.  Following the proverb whose bread I eat, his song I 
sing, when auditors are paid by insurers rather than those they audit, 
audit quality should improve.  Auditors would boast stronger 
reputations as watchdogs with attendant deterrent effect and would 
wield greater power to pressure managers when necessary to apply 
accounting policies promoting more reliable financial statements.  
These effects would support the conservative and strategic 
approaches that complexity theory endorses for improving traditional 
audit practice and its audit risk model. 210 
 
 Second, conventional auditing results in the monotonic three-
paragraph audit report which provides no comparative or statistical 
information about financial statement reliability.211  Except in the 
unusual cases when auditors provide qualified or adverse opinions, 
all audit reports say exactly the same thing.  With FSI, insurers gauge 
financial statement reliability and reflect this in the policy premium 
they charge a particular company for a particular level of coverage.  
This premium-coverage mix creates a transparent financial statement 
reliability index providing financial statement users with specific, 
                                                 
209 See, e.g., Darin Bartholomew, Is Silence Golden When It Comes to Auditing?, 36 J. Marshall 
L. Rev. 57, 89--90 (2002); Norman Bowie, Accountants, Full Disclosure, and Conflicts of 
Interest, 5 Bus. & Prof. Ethics J. 60, 68 (1986); Dale R. Rietberg, Note, Auditor Changes and 
Opinion Shopping---A Proposed Solution, 22 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 211, 213--14 (1988). 
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digestible public information about the quality of a company’s 
financial reporting.  It implements the concepts of worst case 
analysis and graded financial statements.212 
 
 Third, by insuring financial statements instead of auditors, the 
FSI risk model is based on specific information, not inference from 
abstract generalities.  It eliminates concern about whether right-tail 
risk renders auditors uninsurable.  Instead of using pooled-risk and 
diversification models, FSI’s risk model is based upon investigation, 
including the audit.  Most insurance underwriting exercises involve 
classifying risks using general actuarial tools rather than specific 
investigation.  FSI does the opposite.  
 
 FSI is thus akin to title insurance, not liability or casualty 
insurance.213  Title insurance is unusual among insurance lines in that 
a substantial portion of premiums are dedicated to investigation, not 
to expected payouts and profits.214  The central activities in assessing 
risk are specific investigations of property and transaction character, 
including research on filings, surveys, zonings, and permits; they are 
not based on pooled and diversified actuarial probabilities netted 
out.215  This approach to insurance is infeasible for most lines, but is 
the essence of both title insurance and FSI.216 
 
                                                 
212 See supra notes 179--189 and accompanying text. 
 
213 Title insurance is coverage concerning risks of defects in legal title to real property.  Robert 
H. Jerry, II, Understanding Insurance Law 48 (3d ed. 2002).  Home sellers represent ownership 
of title to buyers and, when transferring their interest, provide buyers title insurance policies 
backstopping this representation.  If the seller breaches this representation, the insurer defends 
the buyer’s claim of title against third parties and pays the buyer’s damages arising from the third 
party’s successful assertion against the buyer’s title.  Id. at 48--49. 
 
214 See James L. Gosdin, Title Insurance:  A Comprehensive Overview 1 (2d ed. 2000) (“[A] 
substantial part of title insurance cost generally [is] allocated to search, evaluation/examination, 
or clearing underwriting objections.”). 
 
215 Id. at 2. 
 
216 Costs make specific investigation infeasible for most insurance lines.  FSI costs would not be 
greater than current auditing practice costs.  FSI-based auditing likely would be even more cost-
effective than traditional auditing exercises.  See Alex Dontoh, Joshua Ronen & Bharat Sarath, 
Financial Statements Insurance (Aug. 2, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with *the 
Columbia Law Review) (providing formal proof of FSI’s relative efficiency). 
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 To illustrate further, consider how FSI resembles other new 
insurance products that operate similarly to title insurance rather than 
to liability or casualty insurance.  Some involve a professional’s 
opinion based on investigation that is, in turn, backed by insurance.  
In tax opinion insurance, for example, a tax lawyer evaluates the tax 
treatment of a proposed transaction;217 in fiduciary audit insurance, 
an ERISA lawyer evaluates an ERISA plan’s compliance with law 
and company policy.218  Another example is representations and 
warranties insurance, increasingly used in private mergers and 
acquisitions.219  A seller represents that its financial statements fairly 
present its performance and condition in conformity with GAAP; an 
insurer engages an auditor to review the statements and backs the 
representation with insurance. 
 
 FSI’s affinity with these nonliability insurance products 
renders the analysis applicable to E&O insurance or self-insurance 
inapt to FSI.  Whatever the reasons for widespread audit industry 
self-insurance---inability to pool and diversify the risk or other forms 
of market failure---they do not carry over to FSI.  After all, neither 
E&O insurance nor even self-insurance bears any relation to 
particular audit quality.  But audit effectiveness and auditors’ 
reputations with management bear directly on financial statement 
reliability and, under FSI, auditor examination and reports are 
integral monitoring functions.  
 
 FSI also provides monitoring incentives on insurers that differ 
from those insurers face when underwriting auditor E&O liability 
insurance.  In the latter case, umbrella policies cover a broad range of 
                                                 
217 See Kenneth A. Gary, New Opportunity for Tax Lawyers:  Insuring Tax Transactions, 104 
Tax Notes 26 (2004) (discussing proliferation of tax insurance); Kyle D. Logue, Tax Law 
Uncertainty and the Role of Tax Insurance, 25 Va. Tax L. Rev. 339 (2005) (analyzing normative 
appeal of tax insurance in context of characteristics of tax code). 
 
218 See Jeffrey D. Mamorsky & Terry L. Moore, Greenberg Traurig LLP, Fiducia ry Audit 
Insurance: Risk Management for Post-Enron ERISA Compliance, GT Alert, June 2002, at 4, 
available at http://www.gtlaw.com/pub/alerts/2002/mamorskyj_06a.asp (summarizing terms of 
audit as condition to insurance eligibility). 
 
219 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The Unique Benefits of Treating Personal Goodwill as Property in 
Corporate Acquisitions, 30 Del. J. Corp. L. 1, 41--42 (2005); Dale A. Oesterle, The Law of 
Mergers and Acquisitions 289 (2d ed. 2002). 
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auditor activities, including all audit engagements.  For FSI, each 
policy is tailored to a particular audit engagement with associated 
risk, premium, coverage, and other tailored policy terms.220  With 
FSI, specific financial statements may be uninsurable, but not the 
entire auditing industry.221 
 
 2.  Promoting Competition --- In addition to the foregoing 
structural advantages that FSI offers, FSI likely would improve 
competition in the auditing industry.  Liability risk and high 
insurance costs constitute barriers to entry to otherwise potentially 
viable competitors of the four large firms.222   High E&O costs may 
be due to the fact that policies are insuring the auditor, based on 
pooling and diversification models that implicitly assume no or 
limited auditor ability to influence audit quality, financial statement 
reliability, and risk of audit failure.  But once auditors’ abilities are 
recognized, a different model of backstopping the opinions emerges.  
Tailored to the individual audit and specific financial statements, FSI 
should reduce some barriers to entry that smaller firms otherwise 
face from limitations on existing insurance markets. 
 
 FSI insurers entering the current environment would begin by 
engaging auditors from the existing population of firms.  So, for 
example, AIG could hire Deloitte & Touche to audit Procter & 
Gamble; and Chubb could hire Grant Thornton to audit Bojangles, 
the mid-cap regional restaurant chain.  The large four firms could, in 
theory, maintain all existing work assignments, and the FSI insurers 
could continue to hire the smaller firms to audit the minority of 
public companies they currently audit.  Ensuing dynamics could 
change this allocation of assignments, however, and ignite 
competition among audit service providers that should increase the 
                                                 
220 Criticisms of existing auditor limitations, see Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in 
the Evolution of United States Securities Regulation, 8 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 1, 7 (2002), are not 
transplantable as criticisms of FSI.  
 
221 A condition to the issuance of an FSI policy is the production of an unqualified audit report.  
See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 192, at 432--37.  Enterprises unable to 
obtain mandatory financial statement insurance cannot issue financial statements and would not 
be eligible to access public markets that require such financial statements.   
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number of alternatives available to FSI insurers beyond the current 
crop.  
 
 Barriers of scale and expertise could persist.  FSI’s effects on 
these would depend on how FSI influences the related insurance 
industry structure.  FSI insurers could assemble in-house audit teams 
or establish a network of captive audit firms along the lines of the 
captive law firms that insurers currently use to provide insurance 
defense work.  If the resulting units generate the scale and expertise 
to audit public companies, then FSI insurers would provide 
competition directly to the current oligopoly.  After all, there are 
many more insurers capable of underwriting FSI than audit firms 
capable of auditing large public companies,223 and they operate in a 
highly competitive industry unlike the current auditing industry.224  
Prospects for overcoming barriers of scale and expertise seem more 
likely in that market environment than in the current auditing market.  
 
C.  Comparison and Imperfections 
 
 FSI compares favorably to the current environment.  FSI also 
has its share of imperfections.  The following summarizes the 
comparisons and imperfections before concluding. 
 
 1.  Recent Reforms. --- Recent reforms do not achieve any of 
the objectives stated in the previous section.  The Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act and PCAOB address auditor independence by putting 
supervisory authority in the hands of board audit committees rather 
than in managers, restricting non-audit services, and enhancing 
regulatory oversight.225  These reforms may reduce audit failure, but 
                                                 
223 The number of insurers offering E&O insurance to auditors has declined in recent years from 
more than 100 to around ten.  The Future of Auditing:  Called to Account, supra note 12, at * 
(quoting Ernst & Young partner:  “Ten years ago, there were 150 commercial insurers providing 
indemnity to the major auditors [and] now there are ten.”). 
 
224 Among household names in the property/casualty insurance sector are the following 
companies:  AIG, Berkshire Hathaway, State Farm, Allstate, Hartford, St. Paul, Nationwide, 
Liberty Mutual, Loews, Progressive, Chubb, USAA, Greenworth Financial, and Fidelity 
National.  Top Twenty U.S. Property/Casualty Companies by Revenues, 2005, at 
http://www.iii.org/media/facts/statsbyissue/industry (last visited Aug. 8, 2006) (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
 
225 See supra text accompanying notes 41--43. 
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companies are still paying the auditor.  Worse, auditor independence 
standards may reduce the ability of small firms to compete and 
increase a sense among the large four firms that they are too big to 
fail.  No reform offers a financial statement reliability index.  
 
 A leading academic proposal reinforces FSI’s appeal:  Some 
advocate strict auditor liability by establishing an ex ante damages 
formula intended to raise the stakes auditors face for audit failure.226  
Proponents consciously attempt to make auditors act more like 
insurers, an effort that FSI completes.  The debate concerning how to 
establish an appropriate damages formula also shows the difficulty in 
implementing such quasi-insurance models.227  FSI solves the 
damages measurement problem by using market-based policy 
coverage that establishes predetermined caps on total payouts. 
 
 2.  Continuing Limitations. --- FSI is not perfect.  While 
existing auditing market imperfections will endure or reappear in 
different forms, FSI will shrink the frequency of such manifestations.  
For example, under FSI, insurers and their auditors have incentives 
to detect and correct discovered irregularities in any given year’s 
audit.228  But they may be tempted to suppress discoveries made in 
later years covered by a previously issued policy.  Yet auditors face 
such temptations under the existing system, and FSI’s capacity to 
improve audit effectiveness, produce transparent worst case 
scenarios, and lower barriers to entry should all make this situation 
arise less frequently.229 
                                                                                                                                   
 
226 See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Strict Liability for Gatekeepers:  A Reply to Professor Coffee, 84 
B.U. L. Rev. 365, 375 (2004) [hereinafter Partnoy, Strict Liability]. 
 
227 Compare Coffee, Gatekeeper Failure, supra note 5, at 346--53 (prescribing damages measured 
as multiple of audit-engagement revenues to minimize risk of large awards inducing large firm 
exits by bankruptcy), with Partnoy, Strict Liability, supra note 226, at 373--74 (contending that 
damages measured as percentage of total losses would not pose meaningful bankruptcy risks).  
See generally Donald C. Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 
Ariz. L. Rev. 639 (1996) (reviewing literature and law to evaluate potentially appropriate types 
of liability caps and damages formulae in non-privity federal securities fraud cases). 
 
228 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeepers:  The Professions and Corporate Governance 340--43 
(2006). 
 
229 See Cunningham, Choosing Gatekeepers, supra note 192, at 436--37. 
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 Another imperfection is skimming, the risk of a race to the 
bottom among insurers to increase premium volume by offering 
lenient audits.  Again, kindred opinion shopping can occur in 
existing audit practice.  Under FSI, even if insurers wish to engage in 
this practice, auditors would continue to face professional licensing 
and SEC constraints that should interfere with such efforts.  
Individual auditors continue to be licensed professionals with related 
personal assets and reputation at stake, and this should make them 
effective monitors---not only of management, but also of insurers.230 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Suppose one of the large four audit firms faced imminent exit.  
How would the government likely respond?  Given doubts about 
whether it would allow merger among two or more of them,231 the 
federal government’s decision not to pursue a criminal indictment 
against KPMG, and a sense among some auditors that their firms are 
too big to fail, what would the government likely do?  Following a 
well-traveled path, there is a reasonable basis for concern that the 
government would intervene with financial support that would 
enable the firm to survive or offer funds to provide compensation or 
restitution to victims of audit failure. 
 
 But such alternatives are not appealing, in large part because 
of the moral hazard they reinforce and also because the government 
is likely not as good as private insurance markets at pricing risk or 
otherwise managing it.232  And government intervention is not the 
only solution, even if E&O insurance for auditors is tight or 
unavailable.  For example, a variety of financial instruments traded 
in capital markets increasingly are available to allocate risk of 
                                                 
230 FSI’s limitations can be minimized in other ways too:  For example, suppression can be 
minimized by imposing stiff penalties, and skimming can be stopped through various regulatory 
approaches to insurer oversight.  See id. 
 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 58, 120. 
 
232 Cf. Gron & Sykes, supra note 196, at 461--63 (examining government insurance 
arrangements for terrorist attacks). 
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catastrophic loss from events such as terrorist attacks.233  Similar 
tools can be developed to address financial statement risk.234 
 
 Better yet would be to redesign the existing approach to 
backstopping audits using financial statement insurance to cover 
statements rather than auditors.  As a credible alternative to the 
existing auditing industry structure, a mandatory FSI program signals 
to the large four audit firms that they are not too big to fail.  This 
neutralizes the moral hazard of auditors thinking that they are too big 
to fail and provides a financial statement reliability index that is 
unattainable under the current practice that relies upon a monotonic 
three paragraph auditor report.  
 
 Finally, suppose that FSI is a second-best solution, compared 
to the existing auditing industry model.  Ironically, the very threat of 
a credible alternative industry structure could support the existing 
structure---and improve current practice---by reducing the risk of 
audit firm exit and the corresponding market unraveling that might 
otherwise lead to imposing the alternative or more radical measures 
in the unreflective heat of crisis.  Allowing Arthur Andersen to fail 
left four large firms exposed to serious moral hazard from too big to 
fail conceits.  Creating a credible alternative to those four might just 
save the industry from self-destruction. 
                                                 
233 See id. at 457 (citing Christopher M. Lewis & Kevin C. Murdock, Alternative Means of 
Redistributing Catastrophic Risk in a National Risk-Management System, in The Financing of 
Catastrophic Risk 51, * (Kenneth A. Froot ed., 1999)); Rhee, supra note 15, at 508--09 
(discussing mid-1990s catastrophe bond securitization transactions as way to transfer risk of 
natural catastrophes  from insurance markets to capital markets). 
 
234 Joshua Ronen, Post-Enron Reform:  Financial Statement Insurance and GAAP Revisited, 8 
Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 39, 54--55 (2002) (explaining how insured losses under FSI or E&O 
insurance can be hedged in capital markets such that insurers are reinsuring portions of related 
risk of loss). 
 
